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I. INTRODUCTION 
As indicated by its title, this Article, in significant part, reprises one 
published in early 2006.1  That earlier article had its genesis in the 
confluence of several trends that emerged during the period from 1990 
through 2005.  First, on the legislative front, Kansas enacted and 
subsequently totally revised statutes recognizing two new forms of 
business entities, limited liability companies2 and limited liability 
partnerships;3 adopted a completely revised general partnership act;4 and 
significantly updated its corporation code.5  Second, because Kansas had 
consciously chosen to follow Delaware’s lead in business legislation, 
Kansas courts began to articulate explicitly the persuasive effect of 
Delaware precedent in Kansas.6  Finally, there had been a discernible 
convergence in much of the law governing fiduciaries in business 
entities.  Certainly, that trend was due in part to the invention of the 
limited liability company, which is a hybrid that can exhibit 
                                                          
*   Professor Law, University of Kansas School of Law.  I am very grateful to Charles R. 
Stinson, University of Kansas School of Law class of 2013, for his valuable research assistance. 
 1.  Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., Fiduciary Duties in Business Entities, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 975 
(2006). 
 2.  Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 80, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws 585 (repealed 
effective January 1, 2000); Kansas Revised Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 119, 1999 Kan. 
Sess. Laws 701 (effective January 1, 2000) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7662 to -76,143 
(2007 & Supp. 2012)).  
 3.  Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 140, 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 526 (repealed effective July 1, 1999); 
Uniform Partnership Act, ch. 93, §§ 17(c), 53–64, 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 393, 401, 419−425 
(effective January 1, 1999) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56a-306(c), -1001 to -1204 (2005 & 
Supp. 2012)). 
 4.  Uniform Partnership Act, ch. 93, 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 393 (effective January 1, 1999) 
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56a-101 to -1305 (2005 & Supp. 2012)). 
 5.  Act of May 17, 2004, ch. 143, 2004 Kan. Sess. Laws 1210 (codified in scattered sections of 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6001 et seq. (2007 & Supp. 2012). 
 6.  E.g., Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 144–45 (Kan. 2003) (observing that 
Kansas corporation law was patterned after Delaware law and adopting a rule of the Delaware 
Supreme Court); Achey v. Linn Cnty. Bank, 931 P.2d 16, 21 (Kan. 1997) (stating that “decisions of 
the Delaware courts involving corporation law are persuasive” in interpreting Kansas corporation 
law).  Because this practice has become even more commonplace, this Article will continue to rely 
heavily on Delaware case law.  
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characteristics of both partnerships and corporations and that had no 
history of its own upon which to draw.  More broadly, however, it 
seemed clear that managers of businesses were fiduciaries regardless of 
the technical form in which the enterprise was organized,7 and that the 
real-life problems attendant on such managerial status often resisted 
pigeonholing on the basis of entity form.  Consequently, the borrowing 
of workable concepts,8 and even specific precedent,9 from other forms of 
enterprise appeared to be an increasingly common practice. 
The activity since 2005 has been almost exclusively on the judicial, 
rather than the legislative, front and involves all three major forms of 
business entity.  The trend of Kansas courts looking to Delaware 
precedent has continued unabated.10  However, the trend of 
homogenization of fiduciary duty law as applied to different forms of 
entity has suffered some setbacks with respect to partnerships11 and 
limited liability companies.12  In addition, the law of corporate directors’ 
and officers’ fiduciary duties underwent a major paradigm shift shortly 
                                                          
 7.  See, e.g., Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1259 (D. Kan. 2000) 
(upholding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against managers of a limited liability 
company); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1151 (Kan. 1978) (affirming judgment of 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty against directors and officers of a corporation acting as a 
general partner of a limited partnership). 
 8.  For example, in a parallel to corporate law, the statutes governing limited liability 
companies and limited partnerships both provide for the possibility of derivative litigation instituted 
by a minority member or partner to redress a breach of duty to the enterprise.  KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 17-76,130 to -76,133 (2007); id. §§ 56-1a551 to -1a554 (2005).  Of course, countervailing 
considerations, such as differences in the wording of governing statutes, may prevent parallel 
treatment across entity lines.  Compare N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007) (holding that creditors of an insolvent corporation have 
standing to bring a derivative action on its behalf), with CML V, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037 (Del. 
2011) (holding that DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1002 (West 2011) restricts derivative plaintiffs to 
members and assignees of members and therefore prevents creditors of an insolvent limited liability 
company from instituting derivative litigation). 
 9.  See, e.g., Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 
2709639, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005) (directly applying corporate precedent, without comment, 
to limited liability company). 
 10.  E.g., Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 835 (Kan. 2010) (adopting the Delaware view that a 
plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of self-dealing to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant to establish fairness); Lightner v. Lightner, 266 P.3d 539, 547–48 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding that Kansas courts give “significant precedential value” to Delaware cases and applying 
Delaware’s “quintessential test” for distinguishing direct from derivative causes of action). 
 11.  See Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 122, 138–39 (Kan. 2006) (holding 
that partners are not true trustees and are held to a lesser standard of loyalty than that applicable to 
corporate directors). 
 12.  See Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218–20 (Del. 2012) 
(disapproving as unwarranted dictum the Court of Chancery’s opinion that equity imposes default 
fiduciary duties on managers of limited liability companies). 
2013] FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BUSINESS ENTITIES REVISITED 925 
after publication of the original article.13  Like the original, the modest 
goal of this Article is to survey generally the law of fiduciary duties with 
respect to Kansas corporations, partnerships (general and limited 
liability), limited partnerships, and limited liability companies, and to 
illustrate the extent to which corporate law concepts and precedents are 
being applied (or not applied) in the context of these other forms of 
business organization.  Part II considers fiduciary status, Part III the duty 
of care, and Part IV the duty of loyalty. 
II. FIDUCIARY STATUS 
A fiduciary relationship is one in which a person transacts business 
or manages money or property, not primarily for the person’s own 
benefit, but for the benefit of another.  It involves discretionary authority 
on the part of the fiduciary and dependency and reliance on the part of 
the beneficiary.14 
A. Corporations 
In Kansas and elsewhere, the bedrock statutory corporate norm is 
that the business and affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the 
direction of its board of directors.15  In pursuit of this function, the board 
elects officers16 who are agents of the corporate entity17 and who exercise 
the managerial authority formally and informally delegated to them by 
the board.  Because they manage the business for the benefit of the 
shareholders, corporate directors and officers have long been recognized 
to occupy a fiduciary relationship to both the corporation and its 
shareholders.18 
                                                          
 13.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (holding that good faith is a part of 
the duty of loyalty rather than a separate, freestanding fiduciary duty); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52–53 (Del. 2006) (distinguishing lack of good faith from gross 
negligence). 
 14.  Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1258–59 (D. Kan. 2000); 
Dension State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 
(9th ed. 2009).  
 15.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301(a) (2007). 
 16.  Id. § 17-6302(a), (b). 
 17.  Although technically, neither the board of directors nor an individual director is, as such, an 
agent of the corporation, corporate officers are agents.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C 
& cmts. (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006).  Agency, by definition, 
is a fiduciary relationship.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01. 
 18.  E.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009) (holding that corporate officers 
are subject to the same fiduciary duties as corporate directors); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 
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Shareholders, on the other hand, traditionally have not been regarded 
as fiduciaries.19  This result is justified on the basis that, when acting as a 
shareholder, a person acts as an owner rather than in a representative, 
managerial capacity.  Controlling shareholders, however, have come to 
stand on a different footing. 
Because directors and officers manage the business, nearly all 
situations that spawn breach of fiduciary duty allegations involve 
director or officer conduct.  If a controlling shareholder is an individual, 
the shareholder usually will also be a director and officer and will be 
subject to fiduciary duties in those capacities.20  If a controlling 
shareholder is another business entity, it cannot personally be a director 
or officer, but it typically will place its own officers, agents, and 
employees in those positions.21  If the controlling shareholder dominates 
and controls those individuals when they act in a managerial capacity as 
corporate directors and officers, they will be treated as “interested” in the 
transaction or conduct at issue, and the controlling shareholder will be 
subject to vicarious fiduciary responsibility as a matter of basic agency 
law.22 
This theory of fiduciary responsibility, and the distinction between 
acting as an owner and acting in a representative, managerial capacity, 
are both clearly articulated in the classic case of Zahn v. Transamerica 
Corp.23  The court emphasized: 
                                                                                                                       
 
P.2d 1136 (Kan. 1978) (“Kansas has always imposed a . . . fiduciary duty on officers and 
directors . . . to act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders.”).  In addition, if a 
corporation is insolvent, creditors replace the shareholders as ultimate stakeholders, and the 
directors’ focus in managing the business must shift accordingly.  N. Am. Catholic Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 102 (Del. 2007).  However, corporate 
creditors, unlike shareholders, are not the direct beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties and may 
not assert individual causes of action against the board.  Id. at 103; see also Speer v. Dighton Grain, 
Inc., 624 P.2d 952, 961 (Kan. 1981) (stating that directors are only liable to creditors in certain 
situations, not including corporate insolvency). 
 19.  E.g., Hunt v. Data Mgmt. Res., Inc., 985 P.2d 730, 732 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“The law 
does not impose a strict fiduciary duty on a shareholder to act in the best interest of the 
corporation.”); Ritchie v. McGrath, 571 P.2d 17, 24 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (finding no breach of 
fiduciary duty when majority shareholders sold stock for more than book value). 
 20.  Cf. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 1.23(b) (1994) (stating that a shareholder is “interested” in a transaction or conduct if the 
shareholder is a party or if the shareholder is also interested in the shareholder’s capacity as a 
director or officer). 
 21.  Occasionally, this will also be true of a controlling shareholder who is an individual. 
 22.  See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. July 24, 2009); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.23(a)(4); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 2, 212, 219; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 2.04, 7.04, 
7.07.  
 23.  162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). 
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[T]here is a radical difference when a stockholder is voting strictly as a 
stockholder and when voting as a director; that when voting as a 
stockholder he may have the legal right to vote with a view of his own 
benefits and to represent himself only; but that when he votes as a 
director he represents all the stockholders in the capacity of a trustee 
for them and cannot use his office as a director for his personal benefit 
at the expense of the stockholders.24 
On the facts alleged, the operative conduct (redemption of the 
minority’s shares at a grossly inadequate price) occurred at the director 
level.25  However, Transamerica, the controlling shareholder, so 
dominated and controlled the directors that the court characterized the 
relationship as one of agency.26  Thus, the court concluded that the 
liability flowing from the directors’ dereliction was rightly imposed on 
Transamerica, which, because of its control, legally constituted the board 
of directors of the corporation.27 
The Delaware Supreme Court took this same approach, albeit in 
abbreviated form, in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien.28  Sinclair owned 
ninety-seven percent of the stock of Sinven, one of Sinclair’s several 
subsidiaries.29  The Chancellor had found as a fact that Sinven’s directors 
were not independent of Sinclair, but rather were “officers, directors, or 
employees of corporations in the Sinclair complex.”30  The court 
therefore held that “[b]y reason of Sinclair’s domination” of the Sinven 
board, Sinclair owed Sinven a fiduciary duty.31 
Because of the reality that the kind of domination and control found 
in Zahn and Sinclair will almost invariably exist in the context of parent 
and subsidiary corporations, the analysis became even more abbreviated 
and rarefied in the 1990s.  Section 1.10 of the Principles of Corporate 
Governance defines a “controlling shareholder” as a person who either 
(1) owns and has the power to vote a majority of the outstanding voting 
stock; or (2) otherwise exercises a controlling influence over the 
management or policies of the corporation or the transaction or conduct 
in question by reason of the person’s position as a shareholder.32  Four 
                                                          
 24.  Id. at 45. 
 25.  Id. at 39–40, 45–46. 
 26.  Id. at 40, 46. 
 27.  Id. at 46. 
 28.  280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
 29.  Id. at 719. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.10(a) 
(1994). 
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points are apparent from this bifurcated definition.  First, if the person is 
a majority shareholder, the person is conclusively deemed to be a 
controlling shareholder subject to fiduciary obligations.  Second, if the 
person owns less than an absolute majority of the voting stock, 
controlling shareholder status is a question of fact.  Third, the question of 
fact is whether, notwithstanding ownership of less than a majority block, 
the person “otherwise” exercises a controlling influence over the 
corporation’s “management or policies.”  Thus, the basis of both parts of 
the definition continues to be traditional fiduciary principles: whether the 
person has power to act, directly or indirectly by means of agents, in a 
discretionary, managerial capacity with respect to the property of others.  
The only difference is that in one case controlling influence is 
conclusively presumed and in the other it must be established as a fact.33 
Delaware case law has also evolved to a similar majority-versus-less-
than-majority distinction in its analysis of controlling shareholder 
fiduciary duties.  For example, the court in Kahn v. Lynch 
Communication Systems, Inc. held that a shareholder became a fiduciary 
only if the shareholder owned a majority interest or exercised control 
over the corporation’s business affairs.34  The focus continues to be on a 
dominating relationship over corporate conduct and affairs, either by 
means of majority stock ownership or proof of actual domination and 
control of the board of directors.35 
On the other hand, if no director or officer conduct is involved—that 
is, if the controlling shareholder is simply acting strictly as a 
shareholder—respondeat superior is inapplicable because there is no 
breach by the inferior.  In these situations, the general rule has been, and 
continues to be, that the controlling shareholder is not subject to 
                                                          
 33.  Id.  Section 1.10(b) assists a plaintiff in the latter instance by raising a rebuttable 
presumption of control over management or policies if the person owns or controls more than 
twenty-five percent of the voting stock. 
 34.  638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994). 
 35.  See id. at 1114.  The Kahn court stated: 
Alcatel held a 43.3 percent minority share of stock in Lynch.  Therefore, the threshold 
question . . . was whether, despite its minority ownership, Alcatel exercised control over 
Lynch’s business affairs.  Based upon the testimony and the minutes of the . . . Lynch 
board meeting, the Court of Chancery concluded that Alcatel did exercise control over 
Lynch’s business decisions.  
Id.  But see Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 & n.22 (Del. 1996) (indicating that domination 
and control must be alleged and proven even in cases of majority ownership).  Without much regard 
for the niceties, Kansas courts have not hesitated to impose fiduciary duties on controlling 
shareholders where circumstances have warranted.  E.g., Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1994) (in holding for oppressed minority shareholder of subsidiary corporation, court failed to 
differentiate between acts of parent corporation and acts of its shareholders, who were also directors 
of subsidiary). 
2013] FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BUSINESS ENTITIES REVISITED 929 
fiduciary responsibilities.  As stated by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals: 
In other words, a dominant or majority stockholder does not become a 
fiduciary for other shareholders by reason of mere ownership of stock.  
It is only when one steps out of the role as a stockholder and acts in the 
corporate management . . . that he assumes the burden of fiducial 
responsibility.36 
B. Partnerships 
Traditionally, the near-universal rule has been that partners in 
general partnerships are in a fiduciary relationship to the partnership and 
to the other partners.  In Meinhard v. Salmon, Justice Cardozo likened 
partners to trustees and famously held them to “the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive.”37  The reason is that each partner is an agent of the 
partnership and, unless otherwise agreed, each has an equal right to 
participate in the management and conduct of its business.38  As such, 
each partner possesses the kind of discretionary managerial authority that 
is the hallmark of fiduciary status in a business setting. 
                                                          
 36.  McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) (applying Kansas law).  The rule 
that, with certain narrow exceptions, a controlling shareholder is free to transfer the controlling block 
of shares at a premium without having to share the offer or the premium with the minority is perhaps 
the best example of this proposition.  See id. (noting that a controlling block of shares should 
command a premium because it is more valuable than minority stock); Ritchie v. McGrath, 571 P.2d 
17, 23 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty, even though sale occurred in 
secret); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.16. 
 37.  164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 38.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56a-301, -401(f) (2005); see also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 
cmt. 1 (1997) (“[T]he law of partnership reflects the broader law of principal and agent, under which 
every agent is a fiduciary.”).  What has just been said is equally applicable to both general and 
limited liability partnerships, and for that reason it is important that limited liability partnerships be 
distinguished from limited partnerships.  Limited liability partnerships are an innovation of the 
1990s, and except with respect to the personal liability of the partners, a limited liability partnership 
is, in most respects, identical to a general partnership.  It is formed under and governed by the same 
statute as a general partnership, and its partners play the same role in managing its business and 
affairs.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-101(e) (defining the term “limited liability partnership”); id. 
§ 56a-306(a) (establishing the general rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for 
partnership obligations); id. § 56a-306(c) (establishing the rule that joint and several liability does 
not apply to limited liability partnerships); id. §§ 56a-1001 to -1004 (2005 & Supp. 2012) 
(addressing specific aspects of limited liability partnerships).  Limited partnerships are a completely 
different form of business organization.  They have a much longer history, they are governed by a 
separate statute, and, by definition, they have two kinds of partners who typically play very different 
roles in the partnership.  See id. § 56-1a101(e)–(g) (2005) (defining “general partner,” “limited 
partner,” and “limited partnership”); id. § 56-1a203 (limiting the liability of limited partners); id. 
§ 56-1a253 (establishing rights and obligations of general partners). 
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When Kansas adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act in 
1998,39 it codified partners’ fiduciary duties, exclusively and 
preemptively, as follows: “The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to 
the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty 
of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).”40  Unfortunately, subsection 
(e) of the same section muddies the water by providing that “[a] partner 
does not violate a duty or obligation . . . merely because the partner’s 
conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.”41  The drafters of the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act explained that subsection (e) embodies 
the notion that a partner is not literally a trustee and is not held to the 
same standards as a true trustee.  Rather, subsection (e) attempts to strike 
a balance between a partner’s rights as an owner and principal and the 
partner’s duties as an agent and fiduciary.42  In Welch v. Via Christi 
Health Partners, Inc.,43 the Kansas Supreme Court seized on subsection 
(e) as an affirmative statutory authorization for partners to pursue their 
own self interests.  This made them something less than fiduciaries, and 
certainly distinguished them from corporate directors and officers, whom 
the court characterized as true trustees.44  Arguably, Welch does not 
strike the balance the drafters were attempting to achieve and reverses 
the rule generally followed elsewhere in the United States that partners’ 
fiduciary duties, if anything, are stricter than those of their corporate 
counterparts.45 
Limited partnerships, by definition, have two kinds of partners: 
general and limited.46  Unless otherwise agreed, general partners have the 
same rights and powers, and they are subject to the same restrictions and 
liabilities, as partners in a general partnership.47  Therefore, the general 
partners are agents of the limited partnership, control management of its 
business, and are subject to the same fiduciary duties as partners in a 
general partnership.48  Because, on the facts, Welch involved the general 
                                                          
 39.  See supra note 4. 
 40.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(a). 
 41.  Id. § 56a-404(e) (emphasis added). 
 42.  REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 5. 
 43.  133 P.3d 122 (Kan. 2006). 
 44.  See id. at 138.  In the course of its opinion, the court quoted some of the drafters’ 
commentary but was forced to delete as inconsistent the drafters’ citation of Meinhard v. Salmon.  
Compare Welch, 133 P.3d at 140–41, with REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 1. 
 45.  See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515–16 (Mass. 1975). 
 46.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a101(e)–(g). 
 47.  Id. § 56-1a253. 
 48.  See id. § 56-1a604; see also Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1143, 1146 (Kan. 
1978) (imposing a strict fiduciary duty on the corporate general partner).  
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partner of a limited partnership, this means a significantly diluted 
fiduciary duty.49 
Limited partners typically are passive investors who do not 
participate in management, and who, for that reason, ordinarily are not in 
a fiduciary relationship with the limited partnership or the other 
partners.50 
C. Limited Liability Companies 
In Kansas and elsewhere, limited liability companies have two 
management paradigms.  The statutory default rule provides for 
decentralized, partnership-like management by the members, with each 
member being an agent of the limited liability company and having 
voting rights in proportion to the member’s interest in profits.51  For this 
reason, the conventional wisdom has been that the members occupy a 
fiduciary relationship to the limited liability company and to each other 
similar to that of partners in a pre-Welch general partnership.52 
A limited liability company’s operating agreement, however, may 
provide for centralized management by vesting managerial authority in 
one or more managers.53  In such a case, the managers (whether or not 
                                                          
 49.  Newton imposed a strict fiduciary duty on the corporate general partner of a limited 
partnership.  Id.  Welch does not purport to overrule, or even mention, this aspect of Newton, 
possibly because of the statutory change in the interim between the two decisions.  Ironically, 
however, in Newton the directors of the general partner were also named as defendants, and Welch 
cites the case as illustrative of the strict fiduciary standard to which Kansas holds corporate directors 
and officers.  Welch, 133 P.3d at 139. 
 50.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a202(a) (providing that limited partners’ special rights may be 
set forth in a partnership agreement); id. § 56-1a202(b) (permitting limited partners to be granted 
voting rights by a partnership agreement); id. § 56-1a203(a) (establishing the general rule of limited 
liability for limited partners); see also In re Villa W. Assocs., 193 B.R. 587, 593 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
1996) (comparing limited partners’ passive status to that of corporate shareholders). 
 51.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7693(a) (2007).  Revisions to the Kansas Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act would, if enacted, delete the sentence vesting contracting authority in the members of 
a member-managed limited liability company.  H.B. 2398, 3-8, § 26, Kan. H.R., 2013 Sess. (Kan. 
2013).  Nevertheless, the same result would be reached by means of KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,135, 
which provides that the rules of law and equity govern in cases not provided for in the Kansas 
Revised Limited Liability Company Act.  That reference includes the common law of agency, 
which, as recently restated, indicates that members of a member-managed limited liability company 
have the same agency powers as partners in a general partnership.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. e(2) (2006).  
 52.  See, e.g., Maillet v. Frontpoint Partners, L.L.C., No. 02 Civ. 7865(GBD), 2003 WL 
21355218, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2003) (denying, under Delaware law, defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment that posited members in a limited liability company do not owe a fiduciary 
duty); Cimarron Feeders v. Bolle, 17 P.3d 957, 964 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (finding the trial court 
appropriately compared rules governing partnership duty to that of limited liability companies).  
 53.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7693(a). 
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they are also members) would be agents of the limited liability 
company,54 and it was commonly accepted that they would be subject to 
fiduciary duties akin to those of corporate directors and officers.55  The 
nonmanaging members, whose positions would be analogous to that of 
shareholders or limited partners, generally would not be subject to 
fiduciary obligations.56  However, to the extent that a majority or 
controlling member exercised a dominating influence over the managers, 
such member would be subject to vicarious fiduciary duties on the same 
basis as a majority or controlling shareholder.57 
Recently, an element of uncertainty has been injected into this 
relatively settled and uncontroversial understanding of fiduciary duty.  
As discussed in Parts III.C and IV.C, in Kansas an operating agreement 
may expand or restrict members’ and managers’ fiduciary duties,58 and in 
Delaware the agreement may eliminate such duties entirely.59  In January 
2012, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its opinion in Auriga 
Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC.60  In Auriga, the limited liability 
company’s operating agreement affirmatively imposed fiduciary duties 
on its manager that were analogous to those of corporate directors.61  
                                                          
 54.  Id. § 17-7693(b)(2); see also supra note 51.  House Bill 2398 would also delete the 
statutory language in section 17-7693 making managers agents of the limited liability company.  
H.B. 2398, supra note 51, § 26.  However, as is the case with members, reference to agency law will 
yield the same result. 
 55.  See, e.g., Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1264 (D. Kan. 2000) 
(rejecting manager immunity for breach of fiduciary duties); VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 
2000 WL 1277372, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001) (finding that 
managers owe a fiduciary duty to the limited liability company).  As is true in the corporate context, 
see supra note 18, if a limited liability company is insolvent, its managers must manage the company 
with a view to the interest of its creditors.  E.g., Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. 
Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005). 
 56.  Coventry Real Estate v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 84 A.D.3d 583, 584 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2011) (finding that under Delaware law in a manager-managed limited liability company 
only managers and controlling members are fiduciaries; nonmanaging minority members are not); cf. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7693(b)(l) (providing that in a manager-managed limited liability company, 
no member acting solely in the capacity of a member is an agent of the limited liability company).  
House Bill 2398, if enacted, would repeal subsection 17-7693(b).  H.B. 2398, supra note 51, § 26.  
The REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(g) (2006), which has not been enacted in Kansas, 
addresses the point specifically, and provides that in a manager-managed limited liability company 
managers are subject to fiduciary duties of loyalty and care but members are not. 
 57.  See Carson, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1258–59; see also Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, 
LLC, No. Civ. A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (finding that a member 
subject to fiduciary duty must act in good faith). 
 58.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c)(2). 
 59.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c), (e) (West 2011).  House Bill 2398, if enacted would 
follow Delaware in authorizing complete contractual waiver of fiduciary duties.  H.B. 2398, supra 
note 51, § 57. 
 60.  40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch.), affd, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
 61.  Id. at 857–58. 
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Before ultimately holding that the manager had breached the contractual 
duty of loyalty, and in response to the manager’s argument that he owed 
no fiduciary duties whatsoever, Chancellor Strine engaged in an 
extensive analysis of whether Delaware law itself imposed default 
fiduciary duties that would apply in the absence of relevant provisions in 
an operating agreement.  The basic analysis was straightforward and 
convincing: (1) “inequitable action does not become . . . permissible 
simply because it is legally possible”;62 (2) the Delaware act, like that of 
Kansas, incorporates the rules of law and equity in cases not provided for 
in the statute; (3) the statute allows parties to contract around (and out) of 
fiduciary duties, which suggests that such duties exist by default in the 
absence of contractual modification (or elimination); (4) under traditional 
equitable principles the manager of a limited liability company qualifies 
as a fiduciary because the manager is vested with discretionary power to 
manage the business; (5) fiduciaries owe the fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care; and (6) therefore, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act 
(DLLCA) starts with the default that managers owe enforceable fiduciary 
duties.63 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of the 
manager’s contractual fiduciary duties.64  Having so held, however, the 
court went on to chastise the Chancellor for engaging in “improvident 
and unnecessary” dictum “without any precedential value” about an issue 
as to which “reasonable minds could differ.”65  Although the Delaware 
Supreme Court clearly was concerned about what it perceived as the 
Chancellor’s bootstrapping use of previous Court of Chancery 
opinions,66 its scathing rebuke creates doubt about its view of the 
substantive merit of his conclusion.67 
                                                          
 62.  Id. at 849 (quoting Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Chancellor Strine misquoted Schnell as “inequitable action does 
not become legally permissible simply because it is legally possible.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 63.  Id. at 849–52.  Although the dispute involved only the fiduciary duties of a manager in a 
manager-managed limited liability company, the same analysis would apply to members in a 
member-managed limited liability company.  See id. at 850 n.34. 
 64.  Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Cap. Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1213(Del. 2012). 
 65.  Id. at 1218. 
 66.  See id. at 1219 n.70. 
 67.  See id. at 1220 (“We remind Delaware judges that the obligation to write judicial opinions 
on the issues presented is not a license to use those opinions as a platform from which to propagate 
their individual world views on issues not presented.”). 
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III. DUTY OF CARE 
A. Corporations 
It is generally recognized that there are two functionally different 
aspects to directors’ managerial roles.  The Corporate Director’s 
Guidebook explains them as follows: 
Directors have a responsibility to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.  To do so, they must focus on 
maximizing the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
shareholders.  Directors fulfill this responsibility through two primary 
board functions: decision-making and oversight.  The board’s decision-
making function generally involves considering and, if warranted, 
approving corporate policy and strategic goals and taking specific 
actions such as evaluating and selecting top management, approving 
major expenditures and transactions and acquiring and disposing of 
material assets.  The board’s oversight function involves monitoring the 
corporation’s business and affairs including, for example, financial 
performance, management performance, compliance with legal 
obligations and corporate policies, and evaluating and designing 
appropriate risk management structures.68 
Correspondingly, there are two distinctly different bases on which a 
plaintiff might allege a breach of duty of care.  As stated by the Delaware 
Court of Chancery in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation: 
Director liability for a breach of the duty to exercise appropriate 
attention may, in theory, arise in two distinct contexts.  First, such 
liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a 
loss because that decision was ill advised or “negligent.”  Second, 
liability to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an 
unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due 
attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss.69 
Accordingly, because the policies and method of analysis differ, the 
following discussion considers these two contexts separately.  The 
Caremark court noted that “[t]he first class of cases will typically be 
subject to review under the director-protective business judgment rule.”70 
                                                          
 68.  CORPORATE LAWS COMM., ABA BUS. LAW SECTION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S 
GUIDEBOOK 11 (6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK]. 
 69.  698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis omitted). 
 70.  Id.  
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1. Decision-Making: The Business Judgment Rule 
If directors have made a good faith, informed, honest, and unselfish 
business decision, most courts are reluctant to second-guess the decision 
simply because it turns out badly.  This judicial deference is known as 
the business judgment rule, and, when applicable, it protects directors’ 
decisions that fall short of constituting waste: a decision that is so one-
sided that no person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration; the rare, 
unconscionable case in which directors irrationally squander or give 
away corporate assets; or a decision that cannot be attributed to any 
rational business purpose.71  In Delaware and Kansas, the rule operates as 
“a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”72  
Thus, the initial burden is on the party challenging the decision to rebut 
the presumption by demonstrating that at least one of its preconditions is 
lacking. 
Of course, the easiest way for a plaintiff to rebut the business 
judgment presumption is to show the directors have a self-dealing 
financial interest in the subject matter of their decision.73  Such situations 
implicate the classic duty of loyalty, with the result that the burden of 
proof is on the directors to establish the entire fairness of the 
transaction.74  Alternatively, the plaintiff can attempt to establish lack of 
good faith,75  or that the directors have been grossly negligent in failing 
to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to 
them before making their decision.76  If the plaintiff rebuts the business 
judgment rule in either of these ways, what standard of review applies 
and which party has the burden of proof? 
In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that rebuttal of the business judgment rule on the basis that the 
decision was uninformed shifted the burden of proof to the directors to 
                                                          
 71.  E.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006); PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.42. (1994).   
 72.  E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); accord Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 834 (Kan. 2010). 
 73.  E.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976). 
 74.  See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing self-dealing corporate transactions). 
 75.  See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the requirement of good faith in the corporate context). 
 76.  E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
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demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction.77  This holding was 
unprecedented at the time and was subjected to the criticism that it 
inappropriately applied the stringent duty of loyalty standard of review, 
along with its shifted burden of proof, to a duty of care factual 
situation.78  The Cede court created further doctrinal controversy by 
equating the duty to reach an informed decision with the “duty of care” 
rather than treating it as a mere subset of the broader duty of care in the 
decision-making context.79  For example, one commentator stated: 
Notice how the court puts the cart before the horse.  Directors who 
violate their duty of care do not get the protections of the business 
judgment rule; indeed, the rule is rebutted by a showing that the 
directors violated their duty of “due care.”  This is exactly backwards.80 
Another argued that the result was a substantive truncation of the 
duty of care.81  Not only was this reading of Cede correct, it is precisely 
what the court intended.  In other words, after Cede the “duty of care” in 
the decision-making context has become purely procedural—an inquiry 
into whether the directors’ decisional process was grossly negligent.82 
As a policy matter, the business judgment rule flows from and 
reinforces the statutory allocation of power and functions within a 
                                                          
 77.  634 A.2d 345, 350–51, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).  For a 
discussion of the standard of review and burden of proof in cases involving lack of good faith, see 
infra Parts III.A.3, IV.A.1. 
 78.  E.g., Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
787,788–801 (1999). 
 79.  See Cede, 634 A.2d at 366–68.   
 80.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 83, 94–95 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
 81.  Johnson, supra note 78, at 803–05. 
 82.  Any doubt on this point was eliminated three years later in the Caremark opinion, in which 
the court expressed an extreme view of the strictly procedural nature of the duty of care, as follows: 
What should be understood, but may not be widely understood by courts or 
commentators who are not often required to face such questions, is that compliance with 
a director’s duty of  care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to 
the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration 
of the good faith or rationality of the process employed.  That is, whether a judge or jury 
considering the matter after the fact,  believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees 
of wrong extending through “stupid’ to “egregious” or “irrational”, provides no ground 
for director liability, so long as the process employed was either rational or employed in a 
good faith effort to advance corporate interests.  To employ a different rule—one that 
permitted an “objective” evaluation of the decision—would expose directors to 
substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would,  in the long-
run, be injurious to investor interests.  Thus, the business judgment rule is process 
oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good faith board decisions. 
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996) (footnotes 
omitted).  For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.1.  
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corporation: shareholders elect directors, but directors, not shareholders, 
manage the business.83  As long as directors are acting in good faith, on 
an informed basis, and free from a disabling conflict of interest, they 
should be free from having their decisions second-guessed by minority 
shareholders, judges, and juries acting with disavowed, but nevertheless 
real, hindsight.  Business necessarily involves risk, and risk and potential 
profit are directly related.  Over time, riskier decisions produce greater 
profit, even after factoring in losses, than do more conservative 
decisions.  The business judgment rule recognizes this and attempts to 
free directors from the fear of personal liability if a decision that 
appeared to be a reasonable risk at the time turns out badly.  A contrary 
rule that imposed liability on the basis of ordinary negligence, or even 
gross negligence, with respect to the substance of a decision would 
create an incentive for directors to pursue the least risky, most 
conservative of the options available to them, to the disadvantage of their 
shareholders generally.84 
2. Monitoring and Oversight 
It is a fact of life that as the size of a corporation and its business 
grows, direct hands-on management by the board becomes more 
difficult.  This practical reality is recognized explicitly by the statutory 
norm that provides “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation shall 
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”85  Thus, it 
is both necessary and appropriate that the board delegate, formally or 
informally, many of its managerial functions and responsibilities to board 
committees and to the corporation’s senior executives.86  To the extent 
that direct decision-making authority has been so delegated, the role of 
the board becomes one of oversight or monitoring of the performance of 
the delegates in managing the business. 
                                                          
 83.  E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6301(a), -6501(b) (2007); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858, 872 (Del. 1985) overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (1958).  
 84.  See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33–724; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN,  JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & FRANK 
PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 241–50 (11th ed. 2010) (discussing risk and 
return). 
 85.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301(a) (emphasis added). 
 86.  See, e.g., id. § 17-6301(c) (providing for delegation of duties to committees); id. § 17-
6302(a) (providing for delegation of duties to officers); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.01, 3.02(c), 4.01(b) (1994) (same). 
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Depending on the size of the corporation and the complexity of its 
business, such oversight and monitoring may include: (1) reviewing 
performance of the business and its operating, financial, and other plans, 
objectives and strategies; (2) establishing and monitoring information 
reporting systems concerning the corporation’s compliance with 
applicable laws, administrative regulations, and ethical obligations; (3) 
understanding the corporation’s risk profile and overseeing its risk 
management programs; (4) understanding the corporation’s financial 
statements and monitoring operation of its internal controls and 
compliance with disclosure policies and requirements; (5) selecting, 
setting goals for, reviewing the performance of, establishing the 
compensation of, and replacing when necessary the corporation’s senior 
executives; and (6) developing succession plans for the corporation’s 
senior executives.87 
In performing its functions, the board is entitled to rely on the 
information, opinions, reports and statements of its committees, the 
corporate officers and employees, and outside experts, provided such 
reliance is in good faith and there are no circumstances that should put 
the directors on notice that reliance is unwarranted or that further inquiry 
is called for.88  Moreover, the board’s good faith, informed, and 
disinterested decisions as to the specifics regarding implementation of its 
oversight functions are subject to the protection of the business judgment 
rule.89  Thus, breach of the directors’ duty of care in this context 
essentially involves “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in 
circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented 
the loss.”90 
In such instances, the primary legal question concerns the standard of 
review to which directors will be subjected.  On one hand, because an 
unconsidered failure to act will not be reviewed under the business 
judgment rule, one might logically expect liability to be predicated on 
simple or ordinary negligence, and that is the position taken by the 
American Law Institute.91  After all, the policy of encouraging wealth 
maximization through rationally based risk taking is not implicated when 
                                                          
 87.  CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 68, at 13; see also Caremark, 698 A.2d 
at 968–70 (discussing director liability for failure to monitor). 
 88.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-6301(e), -6422 ; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874–75; PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 4.01(a), (b), 4.02, 4.03. 
 89.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984)  
(stating that a conscious decision to refrain from acting may be a valid exercise of business 
judgment), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 90.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (emphasis omitted).  
 91.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a), (c), cmt. c.  
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directors have not made a conscious business decision of any sort.92  On 
the other hand, the existing Delaware precedent indicates that something 
more than ordinary negligence, or even gross negligence, is the 
appropriate standard in cases involving failure to monitor as well as in 
cases falling under the business judgment rule.  Thus, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. stated 
the standard as follows: 
In the last analysis, the question of whether a corporate director has 
become liable for losses to the corporation through neglect of duty is 
determined by the circumstances.  If he has recklessly reposed 
confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee, has refused or 
neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored 
either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee 
wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of liability on him.93 
More recently, the Delaware Court of Chancery restated the standard of 
liability as requiring “lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or 
systematic failure . . . to exercise reasonable oversight.”94 
These decisions are supported, explicitly or implicitly, by the view 
that the policy of the law should be to encourage qualified people to 
assume directorships by freeing them from fear of liability for all but the 
most egregious breaches of fiduciary duty.95  This policy is also the basis 
of statutory provisions in both Delaware and Kansas that permit the 
adoption of exculpatory charter provisions that free directors from 
liability for monetary damages for breach of duty of care but not for 
                                                          
 92.  Id. § 4.01(c) cmt. c. states: 
There is, however, no reason to provide special protection where no business decision 
making is to be found.  If, for example, directors have failed to oversee the conduct of the 
corporation’s business . . . by not even considering the need for an effective audit 
process, and this permits an executive to abscond with corporate funds, business 
judgment rule protection would be manifestly undesirable.  The same would be true 
where a director received but did not read basic financial information, over a period of 
time, and thus allowed his corporation to be looted.  In these and other “omission” 
situations, the director or officer would be judged under the reasonable care standards of 
§ 4.01(a) and not protected by § 4.01(c). 
 93.  188 A.2d 125,130 (Del. 1963) (emphasis added). 
 94.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (emphasis added).  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), 
expressly approved the Caremark standard. 
 95.  The Caremark court articulated this policy as follows: 
[A] demanding test of liability in the oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate 
shareholders as a class, as it is in the board decision context, since it makes board service 
by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith 
performance of duty by such directors. 
698 A.2d at 971 (emphasis omitted).   
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breach of duty of loyalty or for acts or omissions lacking in good faith.96  
The widespread adoption of such provisions has shifted the focus in 
oversight cases from care to good faith.  Indeed, although Caremark 
purports to be a duty of care case, it enunciates a standard sounding in 
lack of good faith for exactly that reason.  Unfortunately, the common 
failure of opinions to articulate clearly the interdependence of the 
standard of culpability and the presence of exculpatory provisions makes 
analysis in cases lacking such exculpatory provisions difficult.  In the 
final analysis, Graham, a pre-exculpatory provision decision that 
nevertheless requires a state of mind that is equivalent to lack of good 
faith, should supply the answer.97 
In Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc.,98 also a pre-exculpatory provision 
opinion, the Kansas Supreme Court stated the standard of care as “that 
measure of attention, care, and ability which the ordinary director and 
officer of corporations of this kind would be reasonably and properly 
expected to bestow upon the affairs of the corporation.”99  Yet the 
directors’ failure to monitor the activities of a dishonest vice president, 
even after specifically being warned by the corporation’s outside auditor, 
was so extreme that the case was tried and argued on appeal as involving 
gross negligence.100  For the reasons discussed in Part III.A.3, 
immediately below, it is highly likely that Kansas will follow Delaware 
in adopting lack of good faith as the standard. 
3. Exculpatory Charter Provisions 
In the 1985 decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom,101 the Delaware 
Supreme Court shocked the corporate world by holding that disinterested 
but grossly uninformed directors who approved a disadvantageous 
merger were not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule 
and thus faced the prospect of an adverse multimillion dollar personal 
judgment.  The reaction of the Delaware legislature was swift.  In 1986 it 
amended its corporation law to add section 102(b)(7).102  That section 
                                                          
 96.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (2007); 
see also Parts III.A.3, IV.A.1 (discussing exculpatory provisions and good faith). 
 97.  See 188 A.2d at 130. 
 98.  624 P.2d 952 (Kan. 1981). 
 99.  Id. 955–56. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 
695 (Del. 2009). 
 102.  Ch. 289, §§ 1–2, 65 Del. Laws 544 (Del. 1986) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (West 2011)).  The Delaware Supreme Court has described section 102(b)(7) as “a 
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permits a corporation’s certificate of incorporation to contain a provision 
limiting or eliminating a director’s personal liability for monetary 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty, with the exception of liability for: 
(1) breach of duty of loyalty; (2) acts or omissions not in good faith or 
that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (3) 
unlawful distributions; or (4) any transaction from which the director 
received an improper personal benefit.  In other words, the statute 
permits a provision in the certificate of incorporation that eliminates 
personal liability for money damages for breach of the duty of care.103  
Kansas followed suit by amending its statute to adopt an identical 
provision the following year.104 
The purpose of these statutes is to permit shareholders affirmatively 
to “encourag[e] capable persons to serve as directors of corporations by 
providing them with the freedom to make risky, good faith business 
decisions without fear of personal liability.”105  That is, the policy is the 
same as that underlying the business judgment rule, but it is clear that 
                                                                                                                       
 
thoughtfully crafted legislative response to our holding in Van Gorkom.”  Emerald Partners v. 
Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 96 (Del. 2001). 
 103.  Technically, the statute permits only limitation or elimination of the damages remedy, not 
the underlying duty of care itself.  Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92; see also Malpiede v. Townson, 
780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001).  As a practical matter, one would not expect to encounter many 
cases outside of the mergers and acquisitions context in which a plaintiff sought to enjoin a breach of 
the duty of care.  Malpiede itself is instructive.  There, the plaintiffs originally sought to enjoin the 
disputed merger, but the court refused to issue a temporary restraining order, the merger closed, and 
the case devolved into an action for damages.  Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1081–82. 
 104.  Ch. 88, § 1, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 536 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) 
(2007)).  Kansas Heart Hospital, L.L.C. v. Idbeis, 184 P.3d 866 (Kan. 2008), among other things, 
concerned the question whether a board of directors’ interpretation of a corporate bylaw was entitled 
to judicial deference under the business judgment rule.  The defendants attempted to rebut 
application of the rule by focusing on the decisional process employed by the board, arguing that it 
was grossly negligent in the same way as that in Van Gorkom.  In partial response, the court cited 
Van Gorkom as “superseded by statute.”  Kan. Heart Hosp., 184 P.3d at 887.  That is simply not the 
case.  True, the legislative response to Van Gorkom was enactment of section 102(b)(7), but the 
statute is not self-executing.  Van Gorkom would be decided exactly the same way today in the case 
of a corporation without an exculpatory provision in its charter.  More to the point, the statute does 
not authorize corporations to repeal the duty of care; it only speaks to the damage remedy for breach 
of the duty.  Finally, the business judgment rule continues to shield a multitude of decisions from 
judicial second-guessing totally apart from the question of directorial liability for having made the 
decision.  In fact, the court was asked to use it in that transactional sense in Kansas Heart Hospital, 
which did not involve an attempt to impose damage liability on the directors.  For that reason, 
section 102(b)(7) and its Kansas counterpart were completely irrelevant to the case, but the question 
whether the directors’ decisional process was grossly negligent, thus rebutting application of the 
business judgment rule, was completely relevant.  As to that issue, Van Gorkom has not been 
superseded and should not have been represented as such. 
 105.  Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 793 (Del. Ch. 2004); accord 
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (stating that section 102(b)(7) frees directors to take business risks 
without worrying about negligence lawsuits); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1095 (same). 
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exculpatory clauses will also insulate directors from claims that they 
have failed to monitor adequately management of the business.106 
Delaware views these exculpatory provisions as “in the nature of” 
affirmative defenses,107 with the result that failure to assert them amounts 
to a waiver.108  If properly asserted, however, they require dismissal of a 






Nationally, before promulgation of the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act, there was a division of authority regarding the standard of care to 
which partners were held in managing the business.  The traditional 
view, to which Kansas subscribed, imposed liability on partners for 
ordinary negligence with respect to both their business decisions and 
their supervisory activities.110  The modern trend elsewhere, however, 
looked to corporate law and applied a slightly more plaintiff-friendly 
version of the business judgment rule.  The effect was to adopt a gross 
negligence standard,111 at least as to partners’ business decisions that 
turned out badly.112 
                                                          
 106.  Prod. Res., 863 A.2d at 798. 
 107.  Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999).  This seemingly harmless 
and accurate characterization has caused a not insignificant amount of confusion.  See Emerald 
Partners, 787 A.2d at 89–98 (analyzing the effect of 102(b)(7)); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1094–96, 
n.71; E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law 
and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1399, 1433–36 (2005). 
 108.  McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 926 (Del. 2000). 
 109.  Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1093–94. 
 110.  In Carlin v. Donegan, 15 Kan. 495 (1875), the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court for instructing the jury that liability could be predicated only on a showing of gross negligence.  
Id. at 500.  Although Carlin’s age might cast doubt on its present viability, it has not been overruled 
and has been cited as authority for this point as recently as 1987.  In re Novak, 97 B.R. 47, 60 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).  In Insley v. Shire, 39 P. 713 (Kan. 1895), a lack of supervision allowed 
employees to embezzle partnership funds.  Id. at 715.  The court articulated a standard of 
“reasonable diligence” and held that losses caused by culpable neglect were chargeable against the 
guilty partners.  See id. at 717. 
 111.  Until relatively recently, the conventional wisdom was that the corporate business 
judgment rule would not insulate the substance of a decision that amounted to gross negligence.  
E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler 
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984), 
overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) & cmt. f (1994).  
However, the advent of exculpatory charter provisions and the concomitant focus on good faith or 
the lack thereof, combined with Cede’s contraction of the duty of care to a purely procedural inquiry, 
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When Kansas enacted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act,113 it 
codified this modern trend, as follows: 
A partner’s duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the 
conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to 
refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.114 
This standard of care, of course, brings partnership law closer to that 
applicable to corporate directors.  Although it is true that the policy of 
encouraging qualified persons to serve as independent directors is 
inapplicable, the policy of freeing business persons to make profit-
maximizing decisions is equally applicable, with a slightly different 
twist. 
One of the hallmarks of partnership law is the norm that partners 
share profits and losses.115  If this norm is combined with a standard of 
care that is breached only by gross negligence or worse conduct, then 
losses caused by a partner’s ordinary negligence will be borne by all 
partners like any other loss, rather than being allocated exclusively to the 
acting partner.  If all partners are active in the business and subject to 
similar risks in their management activities, they probably would prefer 
this result to one that visited the consequences of ordinary negligence 
solely on the actor.116 
If partners want a more stringent standard of care, they are free to 
provide for it in their partnership agreement.117  They may also reduce 
                                                                                                                       
 
have had the effect of expanding the business judgment rule’s protective umbrella to encompass 
gross negligence, leaving only waste unprotected.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 112.  E.g., Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 14 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying Illinois law); Shlomchik 
v. Richmond 103 Equities Co., 662 F. Supp. 365, 373–74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying New York 
law); Master Garage, Inc. v. Bugdanowitz, 690 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo. App. 1984); Rosenthal v. 
Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 354 (Me. 1988).  See generally Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, 
The Duty of Finest Loyalty and Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule in 
Unincorporated Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343 (2005) (examining the business 
judgment rule as applied to unincorporated business organizations). 
 113.  Ch. 93, 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 393 (effective Jan. 1, 1999) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 56a-101 to -1305 (2005 & Supp. 2012)). 
 114.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(c) (2005).  General partners of limited partnerships are subject 
to the same duty of care because of the linkage between the partnership act and the limited 
partnership act.  Id. §§ 56-1a253(a), (c), -1a604. 
 115.  Unless otherwise agreed, partners share profits and losses equally.  Id. §§ 56a-103(a), -
401(b).  This sharing is typically accomplished by means of partners’ accounts, which are credited 
with each partner’s share of profits and charged with the partner’s share of losses.  Id. § 56a-401(a). 
 116.  Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The 
Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1, 22–23 (1993). 
 117.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-103(a); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 6 (1997). 
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the statutory standard as long as the reduction is not unreasonable.118  
The drafters of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act state that 
“provisions releasing a partner from liability for actions taken in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the actions are in the best interests of 
the partnership” are authorized, but that a provision “absolving partners 
of intentional misconduct is probably unreasonable.”119  This indicates 
fairly clearly that an analogy to the corporate exculpatory provisions 
discussed above is not inappropriate.120  Such an analogy would disallow 
partnership exculpation of both intentional misconduct and knowing 
violations of the law.121  On the other hand, a partnership agreement that 
immunizes partners from the consequences of gross negligence would be 
permissible. 
Whether that immunity could be extended to recklessness is 
problematic.  Arguably, recklessness might be seen as simply a very 
extreme form of negligence.  However, to the extent recklessness is seen 
as involving a conscious disregard of a known duty or an undue risk of 
harm, it is qualitatively different and more culpable than even very gross 
negligence.  As discussed below, it would amount to a lack of good faith 
that could not be protected either by a corporate charter or by analogy, a 
partnership agreement.122 
                                                          
 118.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-103(b)(4). 
 119.  REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 6. 
 120.  See supra Part III.A.3. 
 121.  Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8)(B) (2007) (stating that articles of 
incorporation may not eliminate or limit a director’s liability for bad faith acts, intentional 
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law), with id. § 56a-404(c) (2005) (stating that a partner’s 
duty of care is limited to refraining from grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional 
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law). 
 122.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 n.111 (Del. 2006) (noting bad 
faith includes “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests of the whole body of 
stockholders” (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A.2d 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)).  See infra 
Part IV.A.1 for further discussion of good faith in the context of corporate charter exculpatory 
clauses.  The Delaware partnership and limited partnership statutes differ radically from their 
uniform and Kansas counterparts, in that the Delaware statutes permit partnership agreements to 
eliminate completely any and all liability for breach of fiduciary duties.  DEL. CODE ANN., tit.6, 
§§ 15-103 (d), (f), 17-1101(d), (f) (West 2011).  For this reason, Delaware partnership precedent is 
not helpful in resolving the extent to which Kansas partnership agreements may modify the statutory 
duty of care.  Similar contractual waiver provisions appear in Delaware’s limited liability company 
act, section 18-1101(c), (e), and will be discussed infra Part IV.C.  House Bill 2398, if enacted, 
would amend the Kansas Revised Limited Liability Company Act (KRLLCA) to mirror Delaware 
law in this respect.  H.B. 2398, supra note 51, § 57. 
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C. Limited Liability Companies 
Unlike partnership law, there is no statutory duty of care applicable 
to the members and managers of Kansas limited liability companies.123  
Nevertheless, in Carson v. Lynch Multimedia Corp.,124 the court 
implicitly imported the Delaware corporate business judgment rule into 
the law of Kansas limited liability companies, but held it inapplicable to 
managers’ actions taken for reasons wholly unrelated to the business.125  
In addition, in Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC,126 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery applied the classic corporate business 
judgment rule in granting summary judgment for the defendant managers 
of a limited liability company in the face of a challenge to their decision 
to sell the company’s assets.127  Similarly, the court in Minnesota INVCO 
of RSA #7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLC,128 applied the 
business judgment rule to shield the decision of a limited liability 
company’s managers to initiate an amendment of the operating 
agreement to repeal members’ rights of first refusal in order to facilitate a 
merger that would benefit all members proportionately.129 
This readiness to analyze decision-making in manager-managed 
limited liability companies by reference to corporate law leaves little 
doubt that courts will take the same approach with reference to the 
oversight function.130  Section 17-7697 of the Kansas Revised Limited 
Liability Company Act (KRLLCA) reinforces this conclusion.131  Like its 
                                                          
 123.  Compare. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(c), (h) (1996) (codifying members’ and 
managers’ duty of care as limited to refraining from grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law), with REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 
409(c), (g)(1) (2006) (codifying members’ and managers’ duty of care as that which a person in a 
like position would reasonably exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner the person 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the company, subject to the business judgment rule). 
 124.  123 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 125.  Id. at 1260;  cf. VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *5 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 31, 2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001) (holding business judgment rule inapplicable to 
managers’ decision amounting to bad faith breach of duty of loyalty).  See generally Miller & 
Rutledge, supra note 112 (discussing the business judgment rule in the context of unincorporated 
business organizations). 
 126.  No. Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005). 
 127.  Id. at *5 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). 
 128.  903 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 129.  Id. at 797–98. 
 130.  See In re Regional Diagnostics LLC, 372 B.R. 3, 30 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (applying 
Delaware law and denying a motion to dismiss a claim alleging a bad faith failure to exercise 
oversight). 
 131.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7697 (2007). 
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corporate counterparts,132 it protects a member or manager who relies in 
good faith on a limited liability company’s records and on other 
information, opinions, reports, or statements of its other members, 
managers, officers, employees, or committees, or of any other person 
who has been selected with reasonable care, as to matters the member or 
manager reasonably believes are within the person’s professional or 
expert competence.133  It is important to note, however, that the statute 
requires “good faith” reliance.134 
It is also apparent that members and managers of Kansas limited 
liability companies can contract out of the duty of care at least to the 
same extent as corporate directors and partners in partnerships.  The 
KRLLCA postulates that its policy is to give maximum effect to freedom 
of contract and the enforceability of operating agreements.135  Moreover, 
it affirmatively provides that to the extent a member or manager has 
fiduciary or other duties and liabilities, such duties and liabilities may be 
expanded or restricted by the operating agreement, and the member or 
manager will not be liable for acting in good faith in reliance on the 
operating agreement.136  A similar provision in Delaware’s statute 
validated an operating agreement that exculpated a limited liability 
company’s managers from damage awards based on breach of their duty 
of care.137  As such, the agreement replicated Delaware and Kansas 
corporate law.138 
                                                          
 132.  Id. §§ 17-6301(e), -6422; see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing 
statutes). 
 133.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7697. 
 134.  See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 874 n.154 (Del. Ch.) (“A 
fiduciary cannot select an unqualified advisor instead of a qualified one . . . and then claim he was 
guided by his expert sherpa [sic].”), aff’d, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
 135.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(b). 
 136.  Id. § 17-76,134(c). 
 137.  Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639, at 
*8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005). 
 138.  See supra Part III.A.3.  Delaware has since radically liberalized its partnership, limited 
partnership, and limited liability company statutes to permit complete elimination of fiduciary duties.  
See infra Part IV.C.  House Bill 2398, if enacted, will amend the KRLLCA to comport with 
Delaware law in this regard.  H.B. 2398, supra note 51, § 57. 
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IV. DUTY OF LOYALTY 
A. Corporations 
1.  Good Faith 
The classic statement of the business judgment rule is that  “[i]t is a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”139  
In 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc.,140 stated that, to rebut the presumption of the business judgment 
rule, “a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence 
that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of 
the triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”141  It 
was not entirely clear whether the Cede court actually intended to break 
with the past and recast good faith as a third fiduciary duty, separate and 
independent from loyalty and care, or whether it merely intended good 
faith as a synonym for loyalty.142  Nevertheless, several additional 
Delaware decisions at least verbally embraced the concept of a triad of 
fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, and due care.143  Whether viewed 
as a separate fiduciary duty, a synonym for loyalty, or a bridge or 
overarching concept that connects care and loyalty,144 the primary 
practical importance of good faith was and is that breaches of the duty of 
care are subject to exculpation under a section 102(b)(7) charter 
provision, whereas bad faith conduct is not.145 
                                                          
 139.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 140.  634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).  This is the same court that confined the duty of care in the 
decision-making context to an inquiry into the board’s decisional process and held that rebuttal of 
the business judgment rule shifts the burden of proof to the directors to establish entire fairness.  See 
supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 141.  Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. 
 142.  See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman,”Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert 
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging 
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 
119–20 (2004) (discussing the possible misunderstanding). 
 143.  E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001); McMullin v. Beran, 765 
A.2d 910, 917, 918, 920 (Del. 2000); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221, 1223 (Del. 
1999). 
 144.  See Reed & Neiderman, supra note 142, at 119–24 (discussing different interpretations of 
good faith); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 463–64 (2004) 
(discussing emerging good faith doctrine); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 107, at 1449–51 
(discussing whether good faith is a separate duty). 
 145.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (West 2011).  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8)(B) 
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The duty of loyalty traditionally has been confined to situations in 
which a director, officer, or controlling shareholder has a pecuniary, self-
dealing conflict of interest with the corporation or minority 
shareholders.146  Because Delaware General Corporation Law section 
102(b)(7) and Kansas General Corporation Code section 17-6002(b)(8) 
exclude both breaches of duty of loyalty and conduct not in good faith 
from exculpation,147 good faith finds its most significant application in 
situations that do not involve loyalty as traditionally cast.  In other 
words, the concept of good faith is most important with respect to non-
self-dealing director decisions that are so beyond the pale that they are 
explainable only on the basis of bad faith, or in cases that involve such 
sustained and systematic lack of oversight that they amount to complete 
abdication of all directorial responsibility.148 
Thus, for thirteen years, two doctrinally consequential questions—
the precise content of good faith and whether it was a third, independent 
fiduciary duty—lacked conclusive answers.  In 2006, the Delaware 
Supreme Court answered both questions in rapid succession. 
The most definitive judicial examination of good faith to date is In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,149 which involved the 
employment and subsequent termination without cause of Michael Ovitz 
as Disney’s second in command.  Ovitz’s tenure at Disney was a brief 
fourteen months and, pursuant to his employment agreement, his 
termination netted him approximately $130 million in cash and stock 
options.  Several shareholders brought derivative actions against the 
Disney directors attacking the decisional processes that resulted in 
Ovitz’s employment and termination.  The gravamen of the complaint 
was that the board’s compensation committee and full board violated 
their respective duties of good faith by making material decisions 
without either adequate information or deliberation.150 
                                                                                                                       
 
(2007) is to the same effect.  See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 146.  See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (discussing when the business 
judgment rule can apply), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (same); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, 
supra note 107, at 1451 (noting that the preferable approach is to treat good faith and loyalty 
separately because self-dealing is unnecessary for a good faith violation). 
 147.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i), (ii); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8)(A), (B). 
 148.  See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 107, at 1451; see also Reid & Neiderman, supra 
note 142, at 124–40 (discussing extensively both types of cases.). 
 149.  906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 150.  Id. at 35. 
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There are three critically important parts to the Disney opinion.  The 
first is entitled “The Due Care Determinations,” and concerns 
applicability of the business judgment rule to the employment decisions 
made by the board and compensation committee.151  It is important to 
understand why this discussion is even relevant, given Disney’s section 
102(b)(7) charter provision that exculpated the directors from money 
damage liability for breach of duty of care.  The reason is that the 
business judgment rule presumes the board (and committee) acted on an 
informed basis in the good faith and honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interest of the company.  This presumption is sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement that the directors initially produce evidence of 
good faith.152  If the business judgment rule is rebutted, the burden of 
proof shifts to the directors to establish the entire fairness of their 
decision-making process and the decision resulting from it.153  Plaintiffs 
may rebut the business judgment rule by making a prima facie showing 
of: breach of the duty of care (gross negligence in the decisional 
process), bad faith, or conflict of interest.  It is easier for plaintiffs to 
make a prima facie showing of lack of due care (gross negligence in the 
decisional process) than to make a prima facie showing of either bad 
faith or conflict of interest (unless, of course, such a conflict exists on the 
facts).  Therefore, the plaintiffs attempted to establish breach of duty of 
care (gross negligence in the decisional process) as a threshold matter to 
get the case tried under the strict review standard with the burden of 
proof on the defendants to establish the fairness of the employment 
contract and their good faith in approving it.154  The plaintiffs argued that 
the compensation committee and full board were grossly negligent in 
making material decisions without adequate information or deliberation.  
The chancellor found that the committee’s and board’s decisional 
processes, while far from constituting best practices, did not amount to 
gross negligence, and the supreme court affirmed on the basis of the 
limited scope of appellate review of findings of fact.155 
The second, and most important part of the Disney opinion is entitled 
“The Good Faith Determinations.”156  Undeterred by their lack of success 
regarding due care, the plaintiffs argued that the compensation 
committee’s and full board’s decisions were not made in good faith 
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 52–62. 
 152.  See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 153.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 350, 361 (Del. 1993). 
 154.  Disney, 906 A.2d at 52–53. 
 155.  Id. at 55–60. 
 156.  Id. at 62–68. 
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because they were made without adequate information and deliberation.  
Having failed to establish gross negligence, it is hardly surprising that the 
plaintiffs were also unable to establish bad faith by equating it to gross 
negligence.  In addition to being factually deficient, the plaintiff’s case 
was legally deficient under the chancellor’s nonexclusive definition of 
bad faith: “intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s 
responsibilities,” and “intentional[] fail[ure] to act in the face of a known 
duty to act.”157  The legal correctness of this definition prompted an 
extended discussion of good faith by the supreme court. 
The court began by observing that there are at least three categories 
of fiduciary behavior that might be labeled as bad faith.  The first, at one 
end of the spectrum, is subjective bad faith—conduct motivated by an 
actual intent to do harm.158  This category is so self-evident it merited no 
further consideration.  The second, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is 
lack of due care (gross negligence), as asserted by the plaintiffs.  The 
court unequivocally concluded that gross negligence could not be 
equated with bad faith, because to do so would be to eviscerate section 
102(b)(7), the whole point of which is to permit exculpation of duty of 
care breaches but not acts and omissions lacking good faith.159  This left 
a third category that fell in between the first two and is what the 
chancellor’s definition intended to capture.  The court explained why this 
category must constitute a violation of the duty to act in good faith, as 
follows: 
[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either 
disloyalty in the classic sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest 
of the fiduciary or of a related person to the interest of the corporation) 
or gross negligence.  Cases have arisen where corporate directors have 
no conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that 
is more culpable than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all 
facts material to the decision.  To protect the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, fiduciary conduct of this kind, which 
does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively 
more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed.  A vehicle 
is needed to address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal 
vehicle is the duty to act in good faith.160 
                                                          
 157.  Id. at 63, 67. 
 158.  Id. at 64. 
 159.  Id. at 64–66.  The court also relied on section 145 of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, which the court read as permitting indemnification of litigation expenses incurred by reason of 
a duty of care violation but not for a violation of the duty to act in good faith.  Id. at 66. 
 160.  Id. 
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In so holding, however, the court declined to address whether the duty to 
act in good faith was a third fiduciary duty, independent of both care and 
loyalty.161 
Because the business judgment rule had not been rebutted, the third 
major part of the Disney opinion, entitled “The Waste Claim,” involved 
its actual application and a final attempt by the plaintiffs to prove that a 
severance payment of $130 million for less than a year and a half of 
unsatisfactory work was waste and therefore outside the protection of the 
business judgment rule.162  The court began by defining “waste” as an 
exchange that is “so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound 
judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate 
consideration,” an “unconscionable case where directors irrationally 
squander or give away corporate assets,”163 and a decision that cannot be 
“attributed to any rational business purpose.”164  The court then rejected 
the argument that Ovitz’s severance package amounted to waste.  The 
payment of $130 million was contractually required and therefore could 
not be waste unless the contractual provisions that required it themselves 
constituted waste.  Moreover, the contract was not waste, because Ovitz 
appeared to be a good hire at the time, and the compensation features 
were necessary to induce him to relinquish his lucrative position at his 
privately owned Hollywood talent agency.  Therefore, the terms of the 
employment contract were not irrational.165 
Although the court did not make the point explicitly, it is clear that 
waste is bad faith conduct.  Logically, if this were not so, waste would be 
exculpable and there would have been no need to decide the merits of 
whether the severance package amounted to waste.  In addition, waste, as 
defined by the court, is certainly qualitatively more culpable than gross 
negligence and yet does not involve disloyalty as classically defined.  As 
such, it falls into that middle ground that the court identified as requiring 
proscription by means of the duty of good faith.  Finally, in a footnote, 
the court cited “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the 
interests of the whole body of stockholders” as an example of bad 
faith.166  The necessary conclusion is that waste constitutes bad faith 
                                                          
 161.  Id. at 67 n.112. 
 162.  Id. at 73–75. 
 163.  Id. at 74 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000)). 
 164.  Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
 165.  Id. at 74–75. 
 166.  Id. at 67 n.111 (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Corp., 147 A.2d 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)). 
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conduct and thus falls outside the protection of both the business 
judgment rule and section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provisions.167 
If Disney involved director decision-making and an explication of 
conduct not in good faith, Stone v. Ritter applied the Disney analysis in 
the oversight context and ended speculation about whether good faith 
was a separate, freestanding fiduciary duty.168  Stone was decided shortly 
after Disney and involved an alleged violation of the directors’ duty to be 
active monitors of the corporate executives’ and other employees’ 
management of the business.  Specifically, the derivative complaint 
charged that the directors had utterly failed to implement any internal 
information and reporting system that would have enabled them to learn 
that employees were engaging in conduct that violated federal money-
laundering laws, with the result that the corporation was required to pay 
$50 million in fines and civil penalties.169  Liability in this situation 
previously had been enunciated by the Delaware Court of Chancery in In 
re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,170 as follows: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is 
predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the 
corporation . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the 
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.171 
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly adopted the 
Caremark articulation of the necessary preconditions for director 
oversight liability.  Either: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement 
any information and reporting system; or (b) having implemented such a 
system, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operation, thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring 
their attention.  The court further stated that this standard was an 
example of lack of good faith as described in Disney: intentionally 
failing to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard of duty.172 
                                                          
 167.  In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 n.113 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(relying on the chancery decision in Disney for the proposition that waste is nonexculpable bad faith 
conduct). 
 168.  911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 169.  Id. at 364–66. 
 170.  698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 171.  Id. at 971; see also supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 172.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
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The primary doctrinal importance of Stone is that it answered the 
question left open by Disney, expressly holding that good faith is not a 
third, independent fiduciary duty under Delaware law.  The court 
explained: 
 It is important, in this context, to clarify a doctrinal issue that is 
critical to understanding fiduciary liability under Caremark as we 
construe that case.  The phraseology used in Caremark and that we 
employ here—describing lack of good faith as a “necessary condition 
to liability”—is deliberate.  The purpose of that formulation is to 
communicate that a failure to act in good faith is not conduct that 
results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition of liability.  The failure to 
act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in 
good faith “is a subsidiary element[,]” i.e., a condition, “of the 
fundamental duty of loyalty.”  It follows that because a showing of bad 
faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is 
essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty 
violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.   
 This view of a failure to act in good faith results in two additional 
doctrinal consequences.  First, although good faith may be described 
colloquially as part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties that includes the 
duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not 
establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing 
as the duties of care and loyalty.  Only the latter two duties, where 
violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good 
faith may do so, but indirectly.  The second doctrinal consequence is 
that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a 
financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.  It also 
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.  As the 
Court of Chancery aptly put it . . . “[a] director cannot act loyally 
towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her 
actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”173 
Although the contours of the “new” duty of loyalty, and the place of 
good faith in it, continue to be developed by a steady stream of 
decisions,174  Stone represents the logical conclusion of a thirteen-year 
                                                          
 173.  Id. at 369–70 (footnotes omitted).  See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) 
(employing a historical, etymological, and policy-oriented analysis to conclude that the basic 
definition of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to act in good faith to advance the best interests of 
the corporation). 
 174.  See, e.g.,  Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009) (finding that 
court of chancery erroneously employed duty of care analysis to directors’ decision to authorize 
merger when relevant standard was good faith); In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 
No. 5215–VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, *16, *19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (defining waste as a board 
decision so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the 
corporation’s best interests and therefore constituting bad faith, and declining to extend 
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process that began with Cede’s reaction to the enactment of section 
102(b)(7) and the ubiquitous presence of exculpatory charter provisions 
adopted pursuant to its authority.  In addition to overzealously positing a 
triad of fiduciary duties, Cede reduced the duty of care to an inquiry into 
the board’s decisional process175 and held that if the business judgment 
rule is rebutted because that process was grossly negligent, the case 
would be tried under the entire fairness standard with the burden of proof 
on the directors to establish that their decision was made in good faith 
and in the best interests of the corporation.176  In so holding, the Cede 
court was amazingly prescient, because after Disney and Stone, monetary 
liability is predicated on lack of good faith, which sounds in loyalty.  In 
the decision-making context, if the plaintiff rebuts the business judgment 
rule in any of the three applicable ways,177 the case appropriately is tried 
under the entire fairness loyalty standard.  If the business judgment rule 
is not rebutted the plaintiff must show waste, which is a decision so 
reckless and irrational that it is explainable only on the basis of bad faith, 
which again is a loyalty breach.  Thus, there is no longer a substantive 
duty of care, and there is no need for one.  If, on the other hand, the 
factual situation is one of oversight, it has been clear since Caremark that 
the standard is lack of good faith, which after Stone, also is the duty of 
loyalty. 
2. Self-Dealing Contracts and Transactions 
“Self-dealing” should not be understood as a prejudgment of the 
merits or even as a necessarily derogatory or pejorative term.  Rather, in 
the present context, it is simply descriptive of a factual situation in which 
a corporate fiduciary (director, officer, or controlling shareholder) 
appears on both sides of a contract or transaction with the fiduciary’s 
corporation, or otherwise receives an exclusive or disproportionate 
                                                                                                                       
 
Caremark/Stone oversight duties to an affirmative duty to monitor risk); In re Citigroup Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009) (same); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. 
Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that “spring-loaded” stock 
options may involve indirect deception of shareholders, and therefore may constitute a bad faith 
breach of the duty of loyalty); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357–58 (Del Ch. 2007) (holding that 
“backdated” stock options constitute conduct that is disloyal to the corporation and therefore is an 
act in bad faith). 
 175.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366–68 (Del. 1993). 
 176.  Id. at 350, 361. 
 177.  See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
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financial benefit from the transaction.178  Quite literally, “self-dealing” 
means “dealing with oneself.” 
Under normal circumstances, the business judgment rule raises a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation were informed of all material information reasonably 
available to them and that they acted in the good faith and honest belief 
that the decision was in the corporation’s best interest.179  Consequently, 
the burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts that 
either rebut the presumption or demonstrate that the decision was so 
egregious that it amounted to waste.180 
The situation is much different, however, if the decision is to 
authorize a self-dealing contract or transaction.  Because, by definition, a 
corporate fiduciary receives or expects to receive a benefit that is not 
available to other similarly situated shareholders, the transaction is 
inherently suspect as one in which the fiduciary may be profiting at the 
expense of the corporation or other shareholders.  Thus, at common law, 
a director’s self-dealing contract or transaction, if challenged, is not 
subject to review under the deferential business judgment rule.181  
Instead, its merits are subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the so-
called entire fairness standard, with the burden of proof on the interested 
director or directors to establish good faith and the intrinsic fairness of 
the transaction from the corporation’s standpoint.182 
A major Delaware common law exception to the fairness rule 
involves disinterested shareholder ratification.  That is, if the self-dealing 
transaction is submitted to a shareholder vote, and if, after disclosure of 
                                                          
 178.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 
1971).  There is a significant body of Delaware case law dealing with the duties of corporate 
directors in the context of hostile takeovers.  The transactions in such cases usually do not involve 
self-dealing in that the directors do not have a personal financial interest in the transaction that is 
adverse to the corporate interest.  The directors typically do, however, have a personal interest in 
protecting their directorships, and that interest may well be at odds with the shareholders’ interest in 
maximizing the value of their shares via the hostile offer.  Complicating matters further, the directors 
have a duty to protect the corporation from threats to good business policy and effectiveness.  
Because of these competing considerations, a complex hybrid analysis has developed that is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  For an excellent exposition of Delaware law as applied in Kansas, see 
Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 147–51 (Kan. 2003), and authorities cited therein.  
See also Annette Simon, Note, MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.: An Attempt to Clarify the 
Blasius-Unocal Framework, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1153 (2004) (analyzing the further complications 
involved if the directors’ response to the takeover threat disenfranchises the corporation’s 
shareholders). 
 179.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 180.  Id.; see also supra Part III.A.1. 
 181.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 182.  E.g., Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1145–47 (Kan. 1978). 
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all material facts, the holders of a majority of the voting shares held by 
persons who are not interested in the transaction vote to approve it, the 
taint of interest is removed.  The effect of such a disinterested ratification 
is to shift the standard of review back to the business judgment rule with 
the burden of proof on the party attacking the transaction to show 
waste—that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would view 
the terms as a fair exchange.183 
The policy underlying the disinterested shareholder ratification 
exception is quite sensible and straightforward.  The business judgment 
rule is premised on the proposition that the interest of the corporation and 
its shareholders is best served by permitting the board of directors to 
make informed, good faith, honest, and unselfish business decisions free 
from being second-guessed by courts at the behest of minority 
shareholders.184  However, if those decisions are potentially selfish rather 
than unselfish, the interest of the corporation and its shareholders 
requires the added protection of scrutiny of the merits (second-guessing) 
by a disinterested, fully informed party (the court).  If, however, the 
transaction has already been scrutinized and approved by disinterested, 
fully informed parties (the disinterested shareholders) further scrutiny by 
the court would be redundant.  In other words, this exception views 
fairness as a process of scrutiny by disinterested, fully informed 
observers, and equates scrutiny by disinterested shareholders with 
scrutiny by a disinterested judge. 
The Delaware legislature approved the view that fairness is a process 
of informed scrutiny by a disinterested party or parties and took it one 
step farther when it recodified its corporate law in 1967.  Unfortunately, 
as is true with many innovations in their first generation, there were 
defects. 
Although there are minor grammatical and stylistic differences, 
section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law and section 17-
6304 of the Kansas General Corporation Code are substantively 
identical.  Section 144 provides, 
(a)  No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of 
its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any other 
corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 
or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a 
financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or 
solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in the 
                                                          
 183.  E.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58–59 (Del. 1952). 
 184.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
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meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or 
transaction, or solely because any such director’s or officer’s votes are 
counted for such purpose, if: 
(1)  The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship 
or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are 
known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or 
committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by 
the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, 
even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or 
(2)  The material facts as to the director’s or officer’s relationship 
or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are 
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract 
or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the 
shareholders; or 
(3)  The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of 
the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of 
directors, a committee or the shareholders. 
(b)  Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the 
presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a 
committee which authorizes the contract or transaction.185 
A complicated, interrelated, and somewhat disingenuous line of 
Delaware cases has construed section 144 to have the following effects.  
First, good faith, informed approval by a majority of the disinterested 
directors cures the self-dealing aspect of the transaction, and it will be 
reviewed under the business judgment rule with the burden of proof on 
the party attacking the transaction to show waste.186  In other words, 
section 144(a)(1) adds a third category of disinterested observers eligible 
to scrutinize carefully a self-dealing transaction: the disinterested 
directors.  As long as they are truly disinterested, not dominated or 
controlled by the interested director or directors, and act in good faith, 
                                                          
 185.  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2011); accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (2007). 
 186.  Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006); Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365–66 & n.34 (Del. 1993); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466–
67 (Del. 1991); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404–05 & n.3 (Del. 1987); Cooke v. Oolie, No. 
Civ. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 & n.41 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000).  Note that section 
144(a)(1) does not require a disinterested majority of the whole board.  All that is necessary is a 
majority of the disinterested directors, no matter how many or few.  See, e.g., Cooke, 2000 WL 
710199, at *13 n.41 (finding that approval of loans by disinterested directors, who were two of four 
total directors, cleansed taint of interest of two other directors and permitted invocation of business 
judgment rule).  The point is especially important because of ill-considered dictum to the contrary 
concerning section 17-6304(a)(1) of the Kansas General Corporation Code in Oberhelman v. Barnes 
Inv. Corp., 690 P.2d 1343, 1349–50 (Kan. 1984). 
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their scrutiny is considered to be an adequate substitute for scrutiny by a 
judge.187 
Second, good faith, informed approval by the holders of a majority 
of the voting shares held by disinterested parties also cures the self-
dealing aspect of the transaction, and it will be reviewed under the 
business judgment rule with the burden of proof on the attacking party to 
show waste.188  In essence, Delaware courts interpret section 144(a)(2) as 
codifying the common law disinterested shareholder ratification rule 
even though the statute does not explicitly require the shareholder vote to 
be disinterested.  This lapse in statutory drafting is a major defect in 
section 144.  Although approval by disinterested shareholders may be an 
adequate substitute for judicial approval such that the business judgment 
rule may be invoked, few would agree that strict judicial scrutiny for 
entire fairness should be foreclosed by the affirmative vote of interested 
shareholders.  The Delaware courts have solved this problem by judicial 
legerdemain that amounts to superimposing a requirement of shareholder 
disinterest on section 144(a)(2).189  Happily, the Kansas Supreme Court 
has willingly, if somewhat awkwardly, followed suit.190 
                                                          
 187.  See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 756 n.464 (Del. Ch. 2005); 
Cooke, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 n.41. 
 188.  Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366 n.34; Marciano, 535 A.2d at 405 n.3; cf. Fliegler v. 
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221–22 (Del. 1976) (holding that although section 144(a)(2) does not 
expressly require a disinterested shareholder vote, the statute does not cure the loyalty taint or 
remove the case from the strict fairness standard if the vote is interested).  Note that, as with the 
director vote, an absolute disinterested majority is not necessary.  All that is required is the 
affirmative vote of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares held by shareholders who are 
disinterested.  In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 
2006); see also Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221. 
 189.  At common law in the nineteenth century, a director’s self-dealing contract was absolutely 
voidable, totally without regard to fairness or unfairness, solely because a director stood on both 
sides of the transaction.  Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and 
Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36–39 (1966).  By the middle of the twentieth century this 
rule had evolved into the familiar modern common law rule, under which a self-dealing contract is 
conditionally voidable unless shown by the interested director to be entirely fair to the corporation.  
Id. at 43–44.  In Fliegler v. Lawrence, the defendants noted the absence of an express disinterest 
requirement in section 144(a)(2) and argued that the statute validated a self-dealing transaction even 
if the shareholder ratification was interested.  361 A.2d at 222.  The court’s response was to focus on 
the introductory language of section 144(a) rather than the shareholder ratification procedure in 
subsection (a)(2).  Id.  Reading subsection (a) literally, the court concluded that the legal effect of 
statutory compliance was merely to move the case out of the nineteenth century rule of absolute 
voidability and into the twentieth century fairness rule.  Id.  That is, Fliegler held that compliance 
with section 144 merely “provides against invalidation of an agreement ‘solely’ because such a 
director or officer is involved.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, notwithstanding the interested 
shareholder ratification, it was still incumbent on the directors to establish common law fairness.  Id.  
Eleven years later, in Marciano v. Nakash, the court effectively rewrote the Fliegler holding, as 
follows: “[S]ection 144 validation of interested director transactions is not deemed exclusive, as 
Fliegler clearly holds.”  535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (emphasis added).  The court then 
surreptitiously added the disinterest requirement to subsection (a)(2) in its now-famous footnote 
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Gantler v. Stephens,191 however, has injected an element of 
uncertainty as to the effect of some disinterested shareholder votes.  
Gantler involved a charter amendment to adopt a reclassification 
proposal in which a majority of the directors were personally interested.  
As required by statute, the amendment was put to a shareholder vote,192 
in which a majority of the shares held by disinterested persons were 
voted in favor.  The Delaware Court of Chancery held that because the 
reclassification was an interested transaction, it initially was not entitled 
to business judgment deference.193  However, the disinterested 
shareholder vote “ratified” the proposal and reinstated the business 
judgment rule as the standard of review.194  The Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the lower court erred in two ways.  First, the 
court drew a bright-line distinction between cases in which a shareholder 
vote is statutorily required to authorize an action or transaction—such as 
a charter amendment, long-form merger, or transfer of all or substantially 
all assets—and those in which a shareholder vote is a voluntary 
additional layer of independent approval that is not statutorily 
required.195  Only the latter are “classic” cases of shareholder 
“ratification.”196  Second, the court held that the proxy statement 
furnished to the shareholders in connection with the vote was materially 
misleading, thus precluding the vote from being fully informed.197  
Therefore, the court concluded that “the approving shareholder vote did 
not operate as a ‘ratification’ of the challenged conduct in any legally 
meaningful sense.”198 
A casual reading of Gantler leads to the conclusion that a statutorily 
required shareholder vote, even if disinterested, will be sufficient to 
authorize the subject transaction but will not have the additional effect of 
“cleansing” director interest and permitting invocation of the business 
                                                                                                                       
 
three: “[A]pproval by fully-informed disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested 
stockholders under section 144(a)(2), permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits 
judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof on the party attacking the 
transaction.”  Id. at 405 n.3. 
 190.  Oberhelman, 690 P.2d at 1349–50. 
 191.  965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 192.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6602(c)(1) (2007). 
 193.  Gantler v. Stephens, No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124, at *15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 2008), 
rev’d, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 194.  Id. at *19, *23. 
 195.  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. at 712. 
 198.  Id. at 713. 
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judgment rule.  Only “classic” ratification in which the disinterested 
shareholder vote is not statutorily required can have that effect.  This 
interpretation of the opinion is reinforced by the fact that the court 
voluntarily reached out to decide this point and also by the court’s care in 
excepting from its apparent holding statutory disinterested shareholder 
ratification under section 144(a)(2), the whole point of which is to cure 
conflicts and permit application of the business judgment rule.199 
On the other hand, the opinion offers no explanation of the policy 
reason that would underlie such a drastic substantive change in the law.  
The situation is even more puzzling when one considers that Justice 
Jacobs, author of the Gantler opinion, co-authored an article eight years 
previously that was a ringing, policy-based endorsement of disinterested, 
but statutorily required, shareholder votes as curative of conflicts in long-
form mergers.200  For these reasons, and because the materially 
misleading proxy statement is a completely independent basis for 
reversal, it is possible that the Gantler court was merely making a 
clarifying semantic distinction, rather than an outcome-determinative 
substantive distinction, between disinterested shareholder votes that are 
statutorily required and those that amount to “classic” ratification.  A 
very careful parsing of the opinion makes this reading at least more than 
fanciful.  Chancellor Strine, one of Justice Jacobs’s co-authors, agrees.201 
A third possible reading that reconciles the conflict would 
distinguish between statutorily required shareholder votes that 
coincidentally achieve approval by a majority of the voting shares held 
by disinterested persons (as was the case in Gantler) and those in which 
the transaction, in addition to the statutory vote, is also specifically 
targeted and conditioned on approval by a majority of the disinterested 
shares.  In the latter case, the “classic” ratification feature of a voluntary 
additional layer of independent shareholder approval would be present, 
albeit in the broader context of a statutorily required vote.  This reading 
preserves the ultimate cleansing effect of long-standing doctrine,202 while 
                                                          
 199.  Id. at 713 n.54. 
 200.  William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1306-08 
(2001). 
 201.  In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 793 n.113 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (“The key is not what you call it, but rather preserving the utility of a long-standing doctrine 
of our law.”), aff’d sub nom. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012). 
 202.  See In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 
2006) (stating that in the context of an interested director merger, as opposed to a controlling 
shareholder merger, it is not necessary that the disinterested shareholder vote be made the subject of 
a separate nonwaivable condition). 
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responding to the court’s concern that, to be effective, ratification must 
be specifically focused.203 
Finally, only if the self-dealing transaction is neither approved by a 
majority of the disinterested directors nor by the holders of a majority of 
the voting shares held by disinterested parties is it required that the 
transaction be carefully scrutinized for both procedural and substantive 
fairness by the court.204  As under the common law, the burden of proof 
to demonstrate fairness under section 144(a)(3) is on the party seeking to 
uphold the transaction.205 
Delaware, however, distinguishes self-dealing contracts or 
transactions with a controlling shareholder,206 which technically are not 
covered by statute.  Because control carries with it the potential for 
oppression, even disinterested directors or shareholders may feel 
pressured in a way that prevents them from being able to safeguard the 
corporate interest adequately.  Therefore, their approval is not viewed as 
a substitute for close judicial scrutiny of the merits of the transaction.  
That is, entire fairness remains the exclusive standard of review.  At 
most, in a controlling shareholder self-dealing transaction, approval by 
disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders may shift the burden 
of proof to the party attacking the transaction to demonstrate its 
unfairness.207 
                                                          
 203.  See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713. 
 204.  In Delaware and Kansas the fairness test is termed “entire fairness” to emphasize that there 
must be a finding of both fair dealing and a fair deal.  See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing the elements of fair dealing and fair deal); Becker v. Knoll, 239 
P.3d 830, 835 (Kan. 2010) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)). 
 205.  See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 
A.2d 218, 221–22 (Del. 1976); Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 690 P.2d 1343, 1350–51 (Kan. 
1984). 
 206.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the fiduciary status of controlling shareholders). 
 207.  Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428–29 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 
638 A.2d 1110, 1115–18 (Del. 1994).  A parallel, but inconsistent, line of Delaware decisions 
recognizes an exception to universal application of the entire fairness standard when a controlling 
shareholder makes a tender offer for the minority’s shares that it does not already own, followed by a 
short-form merger in which any nontendering minority shareholders are cashed-out at the same 
price.  Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247–48 (Del. 2001); Solomon v. Pathe 
Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39–40 (Del. 1996); In re Aquila Inc. S’holders Litig., 805 A.2d 184, 
190–91 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, 
at *6–8 & n.26 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001).  This disparate treatment is explainable, at least 
conceptually, on the basis that the tender offer is a transaction solely between the controlling 
shareholder and the individual minority shareholders of the subsidiary.  Therefore, there is no duty to 
offer a “fair” price as long as the offer is not coercive and the controlling shareholder accurately 
furnishes all material information to the minority shareholders.  Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39–40.  If the 
shares tendered, when added to the shares already owned, raise the controlling shareholder’s 
ownership of the subsidiary to at least ninety percent, it may merge the subsidiary into itself, and 
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Moreover, even a shift in the burden of proof is not automatic.  The 
attempt must be to replicate an arm’s-length transaction, which requires 
that the independent directors, ideally constituted as a separate 
negotiating committee, be given real bargaining power.  The controlling 
shareholder must not dictate the terms of the transaction.208  As a 
practical matter, this requirement typically necessitates proof of how the 
independent committee actually functioned, which leads to the 
conundrum that the burden of persuasion cannot be allocated in advance 
of the trial.  Recognizing this problem, and that a shift in the burden of 
                                                                                                                       
 
cash-out the remaining minority, by a simple resolution of its board of directors.  There is no 
necessity of any action by either the board of directors or the minority shareholders of the subsidiary.  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6703 (2007).  Because the 
legislature specifically designed the short-form merger statute to obviate the necessity of any dealing 
between the parent and subsidiary, the fair dealing prong of entire fairness is inapplicable.  Thus, any 
potential unfairness can relate only to price, for which, absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the 
exclusive remedy.  Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247–48.  Nevertheless, at the policy level, the problem of 
inherent controlling shareholder oppression that underlies Lynch is equally present in the tender 
offer/short-form merger cases.  Recognizing this similarity, the Delaware Court of Chancery first 
modified the Solomon/Glassman line of cases by requiring that: (1) the tender offer is subject to the 
nonwaivable condition that at least a majority of the minority shares are tendered; (2) the controlling 
shareholder commits in advance to a short-form merger at the same price if it acquires ninety percent 
or more of the subsidiary’s shares; (3) the controlling shareholder makes no retributive threats; and 
(4) the independent directors of the subsidiary are given sufficient discretion and time to react to the 
tender offer by hiring their own advisors, providing a recommendation concerning the offer to the 
minority shareholders, and disclosing adequate information for the minority to make an informed 
judgment.  In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002).  More recently, 
the same court proposed unifying the Lynch and Solomon/Glassman lines.  If a long-form cash-out 
merger is both: (1) negotiated and approved by a special committee of independent subsidiary 
directors; and (2) conditioned on an affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the minority 
shares, then the business judgment rule presumptively should apply.  Otherwise, the entire fairness 
standard would remain applicable.  Similarly, if a first-step tender offer is both: (1) negotiated and 
recommended by a special committee of independent subsidiary directors; and (2) conditioned on 
the affirmative tender of a majority of the minority shares, then the business judgment rule again 
should presumptively be applicable to the tender offer and a second-step cash out merger at the same 
price.  Otherwise, the entire fairness standard would apply.  In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 
A.3d 397, 412–13 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc., S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606–
07 (Del. Ch. 2005).  The Delaware Supreme Court has yet to rule on this development.  Its most 
recent opinion reaffirms the vitality of Lynch in regard to a long-form merger with a defectively 
functioning independent committee and without a majority of the minority shareholder approval 
condition.  Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1240 (Del. 2012).  Even more recently, 
Chancellor Strine created the opportunity for a definitive Delaware Supreme Court ruling, at least as 
to the Lynch line.  In In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 6566-CS, 2013 WL 2436341 
(Del. Ch. May 29, 2013), he held that a long-form parent–subsidiary cash-out merger that in fact was 
both (a) negotiated by a fully empowered special committee of independent directors of the 
subsidiary and (b) subject to the nonwaivable condition of approval by a fully informed majority of 
the minority shareholders of the subsidiary, was subject to review under the business judgment rule 
rather than the entire fairness standard.  Chancellor Strine distinguished the Lynch, Tremont, and 
Theriault holdings as involving, at most, only one of the two cleansing mechanisms, leaving him 
free to decide the case as one of first impression.   
 208.  Tremont, 694 A.2d at 429; Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117–18. 
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persuasion is only a modest benefit in a trial with a preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof, the Delaware Supreme Court recently held 
that “if the record does not permit a pretrial determination that the 
defendants are entitled to a burden shift, the burden of persuasion will 
remain with the defendants throughout the trial to demonstrate the entire 
fairness of the interested transaction.”209  Consequently, in the 
controlling shareholder context, negotiation and approval by 
disinterested directors and approval by fully informed disinterested 
shareholders have been reduced to “best practices” that proponents of a 
transaction will use to establish a fair process, and inferentially, a fair 
price.210 
 
3. Use of Corporate Assets, Corporate Opportunities, and Competition 
 
Basic concepts of duty of loyalty embodied in agency law require 
that an agent refrain from using a principal’s property for personal 
purposes, usurping a business opportunity that rightfully belongs to the 
principal, or competing with the principal while the agency relationship 
is ongoing.211  These duties are closely related and frequently overlap, 
such that an agent may breach more than one of them in a single course 
of conduct.  For example, an agent may use her principal’s property to 
usurp a business opportunity of the principal, and then utilize that 
opportunity to compete with the principal.212 
Corporate directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties in this context 
generally track agency law precisely.  Thus, use of corporate property for 
personal benefit constitutes self-dealing and therefore is a breach of the 
duty of loyalty unless such use is authorized by a majority of the 
disinterested directors, the holders of a majority of the shares held by 
disinterested persons, or is otherwise fair and beneficial to the 
corporation.213  Similarly, a director or officer may not compete with her 
corporation during her affiliation unless the competition is authorized, 
                                                          
 209.  Theriault, 51 A.3d at 1243. 
 210.  Id. at 1244. 
 211.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02 & cmt. d, 8.04, 8.05(1) (2006). 
 212.  Id. § 8.05 cmt. b. 
 213.  Becker v. Knoll, 239 P.3d 830, 835 (Kan. 2010) (“If the plaintiffs in the present case made 
a prima facie showing of self-dealing then the burden of proof shifted to Knoll to prove that his 
employment of Morehouse was entirely fair to the corporation.”); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.04 (1994); see also Schmidt v. Farm Credit 
Servs., 977 F.2d 511, 515 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing use of corporate property pursuant to Kansas 
law); Branding Iron Motel, Inc. v. Sandlian Equity, Inc., 798 F.2d 396, 401–02 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(same).   
964 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
after full disclosure, by disinterested directors or shareholders.214  
However, severance of the relationship severs the former director’s or 
officer’s ongoing fiduciary duties.  Therefore, absent a valid covenant 
not to compete, the former director or officer may freely compete with 
the corporation, but may not use confidential information derived from 
the former relationship.215 
At least from the standpoint of litigated cases, the most problematic 
of the three related duties is that concerning corporate opportunities.  Part 
of the difficulty stems from failure to recognize that there are two 
separate issues involved.  First, under what circumstances is a 
prospective business opportunity properly characterized as belonging, at 
least equitably, to the corporation?  This question is crucial, because 
unless one can conclude that a business opportunity is a corporate 
opportunity there is no self-dealing conflict of interest.  That is, unless 
the opportunity is at least equitably that of the corporation, the director or 
officer who takes it will not be receiving a benefit from the corporation 
that other, similarly situated shareholders are not receiving.216  Second, 
assuming an opportunity is a corporate opportunity, under what 
circumstances is a director or officer justified in taking the opportunity 
for herself? 
As to the first issue, there are two widely recognized definitions or 
tests.  The oldest and narrowest is known as the “interest or expectancy” 
test.  It restricts corporate opportunities to those in which the corporation 
has an existing legal or equitable property interest or at least an 
expectancy growing from an existing right.217 
Guth v. Loft, Inc.218 casts a broader net.  It is probably the best-
known American corporate opportunity case, and it is widely cited for 
establishing the “line of business” test.  Actually, Guth enunciates two 
somewhat related and overlapping tests, the application of which 
depends on whether the opportunity came to the director or officer in her 
“individual” or “official” capacity, as follows: 
 It is true that when a business opportunity comes to a corporate 
officer or director in his individual capacity rather than in his official 
                                                          
 214.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.06. 
 215.  Parsons Mobile Prods., Inc. v. Remmert, 531 P.2d 428, 432–33 (Kan. 1975); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 & cmt. c. 
 216.  See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (explaining that unless an 
opportunity is a corporate opportunity, there is no self-dealing). 
 217.  See Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So. 199, 201 (Ala. 1900) (distinguishing 
corporate opportunities from noncorporate opportunities). 
 218.  5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 
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capacity, and the opportunity is one which, because of the nature of the 
enterprise, is not essential to his corporation, and is one in which it has 
no interest or expectancy, the officer or director is entitled to treat the 
opportunity as his own, and the corporation has no interest in it, if, of 
course, the officer or director has not wrongfully embarked the 
corporation’s resources therein. 
. . . . 
 On the other hand, it is equally true that, if there is presented to a 
corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the 
corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the 
line of the corporation’s business and is of practical advantage to it, is 
one in which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, 
and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or 
director will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the 
law will not permit him to seize the opportunity for himself.219 
Although the Guth court included the interest or expectancy element 
under both facets of its corporate opportunity doctrine, it interpreted that 
element as being present if the corporation had an urgently pressing need 
for the opportunity even if there was no preexisting property interest or 
contractual expectancy.220  Delaware has since watered the element down 
even more, in effect asking whether the opportunity was one in which the 
corporation was “interested” or constituted an activity in which it 
“expected” to engage.221 
The two leading Kansas cases have not had to come to grips with, or 
even recognize as a separate issue, the appropriate test for a corporate 
opportunity.  The reason is that both, on the facts, involved opportunities 
in the same line of business as that of the corporation and in which the 
corporation had an existing interest or expectancy.222 
                                                          
 219.  Id. at 510–11. 
 220.  Id. at 514. 
 221.  See Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 156–57 & n.8, 159 (Del. 1996) 
(interpreting Guth). 
 222.  See generally Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1147–49 (Kan. 1978) (involving 
appropriation of opportunities to expand existing motel business); Parsons Mobile Prods., Inc. v. 
Remmert, 531 P.2d 428, 435 (Kan. 1975) (concerning two corporations manufacturing specialized 
vehicles).  The American Law Institute has proposed a new, bifurcated definition of corporate 
opportunities that distinguishes between outside directors on one hand and inside directors and other 
officers on the other.  The first part of the definition applies to all directors and officers and focuses 
on how the person becomes aware of the business opportunity.  In general terms, if the director or 
officer learns of a business opportunity because of her connection with the corporation (i.e., in the 
person’s official capacity or through the use of corporate information or property), the opportunity is 
considered a corporate opportunity.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05(b)(1) (1994).  The second part of the definition applies only to inside 
directors and other officers and adopts an expanded, flexible line of business test.  Id. § 5.05(b)(2).  
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The second issue, after a business opportunity has been identified as 
a corporate opportunity, involves the circumstances under which a 
director or officer may take personal advantage of the opportunity 
without breaching the duty of loyalty.  In Kansas, the test is the familiar 
one of good faith and fairness, with the burden of proof on the director or 
officer.223 
As has been discussed, the law of directors’ and officers’ self-dealing 
contracts and transactions has evolved into a tripartite analysis in which 
“fairness” may be determined alternatively by a majority of the 
disinterested directors, the holders of a majority of the voting shares held 
by disinterested parties, or a disinterested judge.224  Unfortunately, in the 
factual context of corporate opportunities, a director or officer may 
simply appropriate the opportunity without first offering it to the 
corporation.  In such a case, there is no alternative forum outside the 
courtroom in which to test the fairness of the fiduciary’s conduct. 
The American Law Institute has attempted to ameliorate this 
situation by requiring directors and officers invariably to offer all 
corporate opportunities to the corporation.225  If the corporation accepts 
the offer, that is the end of the matter.  If the corporation rejects the offer, 
we can look at the corporate decision-makers who participated in the 
rejection.  If the rejection was by a majority of the informed, 
disinterested directors, or the informed, disinterested shareholders, and 
the rejection was within the broad parameters of the business judgment 
                                                                                                                       
 
Limiting this broader definition to inside directors and other officers reflects a policy decision to 
encourage qualified persons to serve as outside directors as a matter of good corporate governance.  
In other words, section 5.05(b) attempts to strike a balance that protects the corporate interest while 
still allowing unaffiliated persons sufficient freedom in their other activities that they will not be 
deterred from becoming outside directors.  Section 5.05 has proven to be quite popular with the 
courts of other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1150–
52 (Me. 1995) (using section 5.05 in finding corporate opportunity); Demoulas v. Demoulas Super 
Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 180–82 (Mass. 1997) (same); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 
1985) (same). 
 223.  Newton, 582 P.2d at 1146–47. 
 224.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 225.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05(a)(1).  Note that the director or officer is 
not required to offer to the corporation all business opportunities that come to her, but only those 
that constitute corporate opportunities.  See id. § 5.05(b); see also supra note 222 (providing the 
definition of a corporate opportunity).  Of course, whether a business opportunity constitutes a 
corporate opportunity may be difficult for the director or officer to determine ex ante.  Adding to the 
difficulty is the realization that the corporation may accept the offer, thus precluding any potential 
profit by the director or officer.  Nevertheless, that is what duty demands, and all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of offering the opportunity to the corporation.  Id.  Section 5.05(e), however, 
provides a safety valve in cases in which failure to offer stems from a good-faith belief that the 
opportunity was not a corporate opportunity, by permitting a delayed offer not later than a 
reasonable time after suit is filed. 
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rule, the director or officer is free to take the opportunity.226  If, however, 
the rejection was interested, the director or officer has the burden of 
proving that her appropriation was fair to the corporation.227  Because 
this articulation rationalizes the law governing corporate opportunities 
with that governing directors’ and officers’ self-dealing contracts and 
transactions, it has become popular in other jurisdictions and is worthy of 
serious consideration by the Kansas judiciary.228 
Finally, note section 122(17) of the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, which provides as follows: 
Every corporation created under this chapter shall have power to: 
. . . . 
(17) Renounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its 
board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or 
in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business 
opportunities or specified classes or categories of business 
opportunities that are presented to the corporation or 1 or more of its 
officers, directors or stockholders.229 
Because this section refers to renunciation of business opportunities by a 
corporation’s board of directors, and does not require the director action 
to be disinterested, it could be read to alter radically the duty of loyalty 
with respect to corporate opportunities.  This is neither the intent nor the 
effect of section 122(17).  The section appears in Subchapter II of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law,230 which contains seven sections 
                                                          
 226.  Id. § 5.05(a)(2), (a)(3)(B)–(C), (c).  Disinterested shareholder approval is even easier to 
obtain under the American Law Institute formulation than it is under Delaware law.  All that is 
necessary is a majority of the shares actually voted by disinterested parties, id. § 1.16, rather than a 
majority of the total number of issued and outstanding shares held by disinterested parties (whether 
or not present and voting).  See supra note 188 (describing and offering authority for the Delaware 
rule.). 
 227.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05(a)(2), (a)(3)(A), (c). 
 228.  See, e.g., Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Me. 1995) (adopting 
the American Law Institute standards, the Principles of Corporate Governance, regarding usurpation 
of corporate opportunity); Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 180 (Mass. 
1997) (discussing usurpation of corporate opportunity under the Principles of Corporate 
Governance); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (Or. 1985) (adopting the Principles of 
Corporate Governance standards).  Although Delaware has specifically declined to hold that 
corporate opportunities must always be offered to the corporation, it has stated that such an offer, 
followed by rejection, constitutes a “safe harbor” for the director or officer.  Broz v. Cellular Info. 
Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157–58 (Del. 1996). 
 229.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2011).  Section 17-6102(17) of the Kansas Statutes 
is substantively identical. 
 230.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 1, subch. II.   
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that legislatively confer certain powers on corporate entities but do not 
purport to regulate the substantive use or operation of those powers.  
That section 122(17) is not intended to affect the duty of loyalty with 
respect to corporate opportunities is made abundantly clear by its 
legislative history, which provides as follows: 
The subsection is intended to eliminate uncertainty regarding the power 
of a corporation to renounce corporate opportunities in advance . . . .  It 
permits the corporation to determine in advance whether a specified 
business opportunity or class or category of business opportunities is a 
corporate opportunity of the corporation rather than to address such 
opportunities as they arise.  The subsection does not change the level of 
judicial scrutiny that will apply to the renunciation of an interest or 
expectancy of the corporation in a business opportunity, which will be 
determined based on the common law of fiduciary duty, including the 
duty of loyalty.231 
That is, section 122(17) speaks only to the legal power of a corporation 
to renounce or reject business opportunities.  It does not speak to the 
overarching equitable fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty, that 
constrain the use of that legal power.  In the now-famous words of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, “inequitable action does not become 
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”232 
B. Partnerships 
1. Good Faith 
Because Kansas law codifies the duties of care and loyalty as the 
exclusive fiduciary duties of partners,233 it is clear that good faith is not a 
separate, freestanding fiduciary duty.  It is equally clear that, unlike 
corporate law described above,234 good faith is not an integral part of an 
expanded duty of loyalty.  This is so because subsections (1) through (3) 
of section 56a-404(b) require partners only to refrain from specific 
conduct involving a pecuniary conflict of interest with the partnership.235  
                                                          
 231.  S. 363, 140th Gen. Assem. 7–8 (Del. 2000). 
 232.  Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
 233.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56a-404(a)–(c) (2005); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-404(a)–
(c).  These provisions also apply to general partners of limited partnerships by reason of KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 56-1a253(a), (c), -1a604.   
 234.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 235.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(b) limits a partner’s duty of loyalty to: (a) accounting and 
holding as trustee for the partnership any property, profits, or benefits derived from the business or 
use of partnership property; (b) refraining from dealing with the partnership as or on behalf of an 
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Therefore, the kinds of nonpecuniary fiduciary misconduct visualized by 
the Delaware court in Disney and Stone as bad faith breaches of the duty 
of loyalty236 must be dealt with in Kansas partnership law under the 
rubric of duty of care, which specifically prohibits “reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law.”237 
Nevertheless, in addition to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, 
each partner owes the partnership and the other partners a statutory 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in discharging any duties or in 
exercising any rights under either the Kansas Uniform Partnership Act 
(KUPA) or the partnership agreement.238  Unlike a fiduciary duty, the 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is contract based rather than 
status based.239  The difference is important, because the contractual 
doctrine is narrowly limited to situations in which an agreement is silent 
as to a matter, but it is clear from what was expressed that the parties 
would have agreed to proscribe the conduct complained of had they 
thought to negotiate the matter.240  Thus, although the language may be 
the same, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is much narrower 
in application than the equity-based fiduciary duty of loyalty.  As such, it 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
2. Pecuniary Conflicts of Interest 
As with the duty of care,241 current Kansas law exclusively and 
comprehensively codifies partners’ duty of loyalty to the partnership and 
to each other, as follows: 
                                                                                                                       
 
adverse party; and (c) refraining from competing with the partnership. 
 236.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 237.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(c); see also supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 238.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(d).  Once again, this provision applies equally to general 
partners of limited partnerships because of the linkage between the statutes governing the two forms 
of partnership.  See id. §§ 56-1a253(a), (c), -1a604. 
 239.  REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 4 (1997).  The obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing is derived from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).  Id.  Kansas case law 
applies the Second Restatement’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract 
except those relating to employment at will.  Kan. Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating Ltd. 
P’ship, 864 P.2d 204, 210–12 (Kan. 1993).  Thus, the interpretation of the common law doctrine will 
inform the meaning of the statutory doctrine.   
 240.  Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1127 n.20 (Del. 2010).  See generally Paul M. Altman 
& Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469 (2005) (discussing Delaware 
cases involving application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
 241.  See supra Part III.B. 
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(b) A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners 
is limited to the following: 
(1) To account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any 
property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct 
and winding up of the partnership business or derived from a use 
by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation 
of a partnership opportunity; 
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or 
winding up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party 
having an interest adverse to the partnership; and  
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct 
of the partnership business before the dissolution of the 
partnership.242 
In broad outline, this statement of the duty of loyalty tracks corporate 
law and, in that respect, is consistent with pre-statutory case law in 
Kansas.243  However, for the first time in American legal history, 
partnerships under KUPA and statutes like it are legal entities, separate 
and distinct from the partners.244  This radical departure from the 
aggregate theory, coupled with human frailty, has resulted in some 
growing pains that partially account for the result in Welch v. Via Christi 
Health Partners, Inc.245 
                                                          
    242.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(b).  These duties apply equally to general partners of limited 
partnerships.  Id. §§ 56-1a253(a), (c), -1a604; Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 
122, 136 (Kan. 2006).  Two other subsections of section 56a-404 might seem to conflict with the 
duty of loyalty in subsection (b).  Subsection (e) provides that “[a] partner does not violate a duty or 
obligation under this act or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner’s conduct 
furthers the partner’s own interest.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(e).  This provision is discussed 
supra at notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  Subsection (f) provides that “[a] partner may lend 
money to and transact other business with the partnership, and as to each loan or transaction the 
rights and obligations of the partner are the same as those of a person who is not a partner, subject to 
other applicable law.”  Id. § 56a-404(f).  Although this provision may appear to be in direct conflict 
with the prohibition in subsection (b)(2) against self-dealing transactions, it actually assumes 
compliance with the duty of loyalty, and its focus is on the status of a partner-creditor vis-à-vis 
outside creditors of the partnership.  See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 112 & cmt. (2001) (authorizing a 
partner to transact business with the limited partnership and enjoy the same rights as a nonpartner 
but explaining that the provision has no impact on a general partner’s duty of loyalty).  For further 
discussion, see Edwin W. Hecker, Jr., The Kansas Revised Uniform Partnership Act, J. KAN. B. 
ASS’N, Oct. 1999, at 16, 32–33. 
 243.  See Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136 (Kan. 1978) (employing an identical 
analysis to duty of loyalty claims against corporate directors and officers and the general partner of a 
limited partnership). 
 244.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-201(a). 
 245.  133 P.3d 122 (Kan. 2006). 
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This important decision involves a transaction in which a shell 
limited liability company was merged into a functioning limited 
partnership with the limited partners being cashed out and replaced by 
new investors.  The general partner of the limited partnership controlled 
both constituent entities, engaged an appraiser to determine the merger 
price, fixed the terms of the merger, unilaterally amended the partnership 
agreement to lower the default unanimous vote requirement for mergers 
to a level that allowed it to control the vote, informed the limited partners 
that it would vote in favor of the merger regardless of how they voted, 
and unilaterally approved the merger without a single limited partner 
voting in favor.246  After engaging their own expert to value their limited 
partnership interests, approximately half (both in number and interest) of 
the limited partners brought suit against the general partner, alleging that 
the merger price was unfairly low.247  The plaintiffs claimed they were 
dissociated partners entitled to a statutory buyout at a price determined 
under section 56a-701 of KUPA,248 and alternatively, that they were 
entitled to an equitable entire fairness hearing based on the general 
partner’s breach of duty of loyalty.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the general partner on both counts, and the supreme court 
affirmed.249 
The portion of the court’s opinion concerning the statutory buyout is 
obsolete due to changes in the controlling mixed entity merger statutes 
since the decision.  The important point, however, is that the court 
concluded no statutory buyout rights were available to the plaintiffs,250 
and that situation still remains true.251  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, 
their breach of fiduciary duty claim fared no better.  The court began its 
analysis by emphasizing section 56a-404(e), which provides that a 
partner does not violate a duty “merely because the partner’s conduct 
furthers the partner’s own interest.”252  The court read this statement as 
an affirmative statutory authorization for partners to pursue their own 
self-interest, which made them less than fiduciaries and certainly 
distinguished them from corporate directors, whom the court 
                                                          
 246.  Id. at 125–27. 
 247.  Id. at 126. 
 248.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-701. 
 249.  Welch, 133 P.3d at 127, 145. 
 250.  Id. at 136. 
 251.  For a discussion of the statutory changes, see Edwin W. Hecker, Jr, The Kansas Business 
Entity Transactions Act, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Sept. 2011, at 21, 22–23. 
 252.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(e) (emphasis added). 
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mischaracterized as true trustees.253  Undeterred, the plaintiffs argued 
that the general partner violated section 56a-404(b)(2) by acting “as or 
on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership.”254  In 
other words, by being in control of both parties to the merger agreement, 
the general partner was on both sides of the bargaining table.  As such, it 
could not be expected to negotiate with itself on an arm’s-length basis to 
achieve the best price possible for the limited partnership and its limited 
partners.  After reiterating that use of the term “fiduciary” was 
misleading and inappropriate because partners are permitted to pursue 
their own self-interest, the court acknowledged that the interests of both 
the general partner and the shell limited liability company were adverse 
to the limited partners.255  The statutory language of all three subsections 
of section 56a-404(b), however, prohibited only interests adverse to the 
partnership itself as a separate entity.256  Although the general partner 
was on both sides of the transaction, the court found no evidence that the 
general partner’s interest was adverse to the limited partnership or that 
the limited partnership, as an entity, was harmed by the transaction.257  
Moreover, the mere fact that the limited liability company was the other 
constituent entity to the merger did not necessarily mean that its interest 
was adverse to the limited partnership.  The court relied on the fact that 
the limited liability company was a shell with a two-week lifespan, 
created solely for purposes of the cash-out merger, as evidence that its 
interest could not have been adverse to the limited partnership.258  In 
other words, the limited liability company’s interest was not adverse 
because it had no interest. 
The court’s and counsels’ preoccupation with the three entity-
focused operative subparagraphs of section 56a-404(b) perhaps caused it 
to devote insufficient attention to subsection (a) and the introductory 
wording of (b) itself, which provide: 
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the 
other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in 
subsections (b) and (c).   
                                                          
 253.  Welch, 133 P.3d at 138. 
 254.  Id. at 141; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(b)(2).  The plaintiffs also argued that the general 
partner violated section 56a-404(b)(1) by misappropriating a partnership opportunity.  That 
argument is weaker on the facts and presents no issues in addition to those raised by the section 
56a404(b)(2) argument.  Accordingly, it is not discussed further. 
 255.  Welch, 133 P.3d at 142. 
 256.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(b) (emphasis added). 
 257.  Welch, 133 P.3d at 142. 
 258.  Id. 
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(b) A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners 
is limited to the following: 
[Subparagraphs (1)–(3), which speak only to the duty of loyalty owed 
to the partnership entity.]259 
Read literally, this language states that a partner’s duty of loyalty to the 
other partners is limited to the following: none.  In other words, 
subsection (a) makes clear that the statute preempts the field, leaving no 
room for default common law fiduciary duties.  Subsection (b) then 
“limits” the statutory duty of loyalty to its three subparagraphs, none of 
which affirmatively impose a duty that runs to the other partners.  If the 
statute means what it says, the necessary conclusion is that partners no 
longer owe a duty of loyalty directly to the other partners, as opposed to 
the partnership.260  If the Welch court had more clearly articulated this 
point, it would have made unnecessary the court’s undue reliance on 
subsection (e) for the proposition that partners are not true fiduciaries, a 
proposition that has the unfortunate potential of living on to dilute the 
strength of the loyalty partners owe to the partnership.  It also would 
have made unnecessary the court’s equally unfortunate, and inconsistent, 
discussion of applicability of the corporate law duty of loyalty, which is 
considered next. 
                                                          
 259.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-404(a)−(b) (emphasis added). 
 260.  If the Kansas statute had not preempted the field, the result might have been different.  For 
example, the analogous provisions of the California Uniform Partnership Act state that: “(a) [t]he 
fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duties of loyalty and 
care set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c)”; and “(b) [a] partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and 
the other partners includes [entity-focused duties essentially the same as those in Kansas].”  CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 16404(a)–(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).  By eliminating “only” in subsection (a) 
and substituting “includes” for “limited” in subsection (b), the statute makes clear the intent not to 
preempt judicially recognized default fiduciary duties.  Thus, in Perretta v. Prometheus 
Development Co., on facts substantially the same as those in Welch, the court reached a very 
different result.  520 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.) (applying California law), withdrawn after reh’g on other 
grounds, 527 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2008).  Recognizing the self-dealing nature of a limited partnership 
cash-out merger, the court summarily rejected the general partner’s contention that the case should 
be reviewed under the deferential business judgment rule.  Id. at 1044 n.5.  Unlike the Kansas 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit did not believe that California’s version of section 56a-404(e) was 
a legislative disavowal of a partner’s fiduciary status.  Nor did it believe the California equivalent of 
section 56a-404(b)(2), which narrowly focused only on loyalty to the partnership as an entity, 
excluded consideration of harm to the individual partners that constitute the entity.  See id. at 1044.  
Accordingly, it held that the self-dealing nature of the merger required that the general partner bear 
the burden of establishing complete good faith and fairness.  See id. at 1049; see also Cole v. 
Kershaw, No. Civ.A. 13904, 2000 WL 1206672 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2000).  Cole involved a self-
dealing cash-out merger of a general partnership into a limited liability company.  The parties 
conceded application of the entire fairness test and, relying on Weinberger, the court found the 
merger lacking in both procedural and substantive fairness.  Id. at *9. 
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As a last resort, the plaintiffs argued that both Kansas and Delaware 
corporate cash-out merger cases supported their duty of loyalty claim.  In 
response, the court relied on Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.261 for the 
proposition that, in addition to self-dealing, the plaintiffs must show 
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct before they are entitled to 
an equitable duty of loyalty entire fairness hearing.262  The court 
appeared not to care that Weinberger announced this proposition in the 
broader context of an opinion holding that cashed-out minority 
shareholders had an enhanced statutory appraisal remedy that normally 
would be adequate and therefore exclusive—a situation quite different 
than that of the plaintiff limited partners.  It also failed to note that this 
aspect of Weinberger has not been followed in Delaware controlling 
shareholder cases at least since 1994.263  Finally, the court gave no 
indication it realized that controlling shareholders, like partners, are 
owners and therefore not true trustees, but who nevertheless have the 
burden of proving entire fairness to the cashed-out minority.264  In sum, 
the lesson of Welch is clear—if partners want fiduciary duties that are 
owed to each other as well as to the partnership entity, they affirmatively 
must include contractual duties to that effect in their partnership 
agreement.265 
From the defense perspective, it should be clear that, although stated 
as absolutes, KUPA’s statutory duty of loyalty rules should be construed 
to permit validation of conduct that technically violates their strict 
prohibitions if the partner carries the burden of proving good faith and 
fairness.266  Moreover, as developed above,267 “fairness” may consist of 
extrajudicial scrutiny and approval, by informed disinterested parties, of 
conduct that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.  This concept is 
codified by KUPA, which provides that “all of the partners or a number 
or percentage specified in the partnership agreement may authorize or 
                                                          
 261.  457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 262.  Welch, 133 P.3d at 143–45. 
 263.  See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (holding that the 
entire fairness standard applies to controlling shareholder self-dealing transactions with no 
requirement of additional misconduct); see also supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text. 
 264.  See supra Parts II.A, IV.A.2. 
 265.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-103(a), (b)(3) (2005) (the partnership agreement may not 
eliminate the duty of loyalty but it may expand the duty). 
 266.  See Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1146 (Kan. 1978) (noting that the party 
seeking to sustain the transaction must make “an affirmative showing of fairness and good faith” by 
“clear and satisfactory evidence”); supra note 242 and cases cited therein; cf. REVISED UNIF. LTD. 
LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(b)(2), (e) (2006) (providing explicitly that a showing of fairness is a defense to 
a claim that a member or manager acted as or on behalf of an adverse party). 
 267.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
2013] FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BUSINESS ENTITIES REVISITED 975 
ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or 
transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.”268  Under 
the statutory default requirement of unanimity, such authorization or 
ratification necessarily would include a majority (all) of the disinterested 
partners.  If the partnership agreement provides for approval by a lesser 
number or percentage, care should be taken to make such a requirement 
explicit.269 
In addition, although a partnership agreement may not completely 
eliminate the duty of loyalty, it may identify in advance specific types or 
categories of activities that do not violate the duty, provided the 
identification is not manifestly unreasonable.270  For example, an 
exculpatory provision in a real estate partnership agreement that 
authorizes the partnership to employ one of the partners who is a real 
estate agent and further authorizes the partner to retain standard 
commissions on partnership transactions undertaken by the partner 
should be permissible as not manifestly unreasonable.271 
C. Limited Liability Companies 
1. Good Faith 
As in the corporate context,272 limited liability company law now 
views good faith as an integral part of the duty of loyalty, either by 
reason of an operating agreement’s adoption of corporate fiduciary 
standards or by reason of default fiduciary duties.273  Thus, a manager’s 
conduct of an auction sale of a limited liability company by means of a 
process the court characterized as a sham designed to squeeze out 
minority members was a bad faith breach of the manager’s duty of 
loyalty.274  So too was conscious disregard of a known duty to act, such 
as intentional failure to exercise oversight responsibilities by consciously 
ignoring warnings of accounting irregularities and weakness in internal 
                                                          
 268.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-103(b)(3)(ii). 
 269.  The absence of such a specific limitation was a matter of contention in Perratta v. 
Prometheus Dev. Co., 520 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.), withdrawn after reh’g on other grounds, 527 F.3d 
853 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 270.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-103(b)(3)(i). 
 271.  REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 4 (1997). 
 272.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 273.  Gatz Props. LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del.) (contractual corporate 
fiduciary duty of loyalty), aff’g on other grounds, 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012) (limited liability 
company default duty of loyalty). 
 274.  Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props. LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 873–75 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 59 A.3d 
1206, (Del. 2012). 
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controls.275  Similarly, a business decision by disinterested managers that 
is so egregious that it amounts to waste can be found to have been made 
in bad faith and for that reason fall outside the protection of the business 
judgment rule.276  More generally, managers’ acts done in technical 
compliance with the law governing limited liability companies but for 
the purpose of diluting a member’s equity amount to disloyal bad faith 
breaches of fiduciary duty.277 
 
2.    Pecuniary Conflicts of Interest 
 
There is ample Delaware precedent applying “classic” corporate 
directors’ loyalty concepts to managers of limited liability companies.  
For example, in William Penn Partnership v. Saliba,278 the operating 
agreement did not purport to modify fiduciary duties, and the parties 
agreed that the managers therefore owed traditional duties of care and 
loyalty to the members.279  By standing on both sides of the sale of the 
limited liability company’s sole asset, the managers had the burden of 
proving the entire fairness of the transaction.280  In addition, Delaware 
routinely applies the entire fairness standard that governs self-dealing 
corporate mergers to analogous situations involving limited liability 
companies.281  However, approval of a self-dealing transaction by an 
informed majority of the disinterested managers obviates the necessity of 
a fairness inquiry and insulates the transaction under the business 
judgment rule.282  Finally, traditional application of the duty to account 
for profits from misappropriation of entity property and nonconsensual 
                                                          
 275.  See, e.g., Reg’l Diagnostics, LLC v. Zelch, 372 B.R. 3, 30–37 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(applying Delaware law and relying on Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)). 
 276.  See, e.g., Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 
2709639, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct 14, 2005) (“[T]he subjective bad faith of directors may be inferred 
from corporate actions which are ‘so egregious as to be afforded no presumption of business 
judgment protection.’” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000))). 
 277.  See, e.g., Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, LLC, No. Civ. A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. April 25, 2002); VGS, Inc, v. Castiel, No. Civ. A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *4–5 
(Del. Ch. Aug 31, 2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001). 
 278.  13 A.3d 749 (Del. 2011). 
 279.  Id. at 756. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  See, e.g., Solar Cells, Inc., 2002 WL 749163, at *4–6; VGS, Inc., 2000 WL 1277372, at 
*4–5 (explaining that the entire fairness standard must be applied to the proposed mergers). 
 282.  See Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, No. Civ. A. 454-N, 2005 WL 2709639, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2005). 
2013] FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN BUSINESS ENTITIES REVISITED 977 
competition also has been applied to managers of limited liability 
companies.283 
As has previously been mentioned,284  KRLLCA states that its policy 
is to give maximum effect to freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of operating agreements.285  More specifically, it provides 
that to the extent a member, manager, or other person has duties and 
liabilities, including fiduciary duties, to the limited liability company or 
to another member or manager, such duties and liabilities may be 
expanded or restricted by the operating agreement.286  Moreover, any 
such member, manager, or other person acting under an operating 
agreement will not be liable for good faith reliance on the operating 
agreement.287  These provisions obviously emphasize the contractual 
nature of limited liability companies and are especially relevant to the 
nature and scope of fiduciary duties.  A sampling of the many judicial 
opinions concerning the effect of operating agreements on fiduciary 
duties provides useful insight. 
In Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson Communications, L.L.C., an 
operating agreement provided that opportunities in the limited liability 
company’s line of business that came to a member from certain 
designated sources or that existed in specified geographical areas must 
first be offered to the company and rejected before being pursued 
individually by the member.288  It also stated that members and managers 
could engage in other businesses of any nature without being deemed to 
have violated any duty to the limited liability company or to the other 
members.289  The court held that these provisions were authorized by the 
statute and that the contractual duties supplanted any more generalized 
common law duties relating to business opportunities or competition.290 
The operating agreement in Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital 
Corp.291 provided that: 
Neither the Manager nor any other Member shall be entitled to cause 
the Company to . . . enter into any additional agreements with affiliates 
on terms and conditions which are less favorable to the Company than 
                                                          
 283.  Phillips v. Hove, No. 3644–VCL, 2011 WL 4404034, at *24–25 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 2011). 
 284.  See supra text accompanying notes 104–06. 
 285.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(b) (2007). 
 286.  Id. § 17-76,134(c)(2). 
 287.  Id. § 17-76,134(c)(1). 
 288.  102 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (D. Kan. 2000). 
 289.  Id. at 1262–63. 
 290.  See id. at 1265. 
 291.  59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). 
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the terms and conditions of similar agreements which could then be 
entered into with arms-length third parties, without the consent of a 
majority of the non-affiliated Members . . . .292 
The court interpreted this language as the contractual equivalent of the 
entire fairness standard of conduct and judicial review, with the burden 
of establishing the fairness of the transaction on the manager.293  
Moreover, had the manager conditioned the transaction on the approval 
of an informed majority of the nonaffiliated members, the transaction 
would not have been subject to, or reviewed under, that standard.294 
In Solar Cells, Inc. v. True North Partners, LLC, the operating 
agreement recognized the potential for conflicts of interest between the 
controlling member and managers appointed by it and the limited 
liability company and its other member.295  In the event of such a 
conflict, the agreement provided that neither the managers nor the 
controlling member would have any liability as long as the managers 
acted in the good faith belief that their decision was in the best interest of 
the company.296  In a suit by the other member to enjoin an allegedly 
unfair self-dealing merger, the court held the provision in the operating 
agreement to be inapplicable because it only purported to limit liability 
rather than to waive completely the traditional duty of loyalty.297 
The Solar Cells case raises the question whether the current Kansas 
statutory language that permits fiduciary and other duties to be 
“expanded or restricted” by the operating agreement298 is sufficiently 
broad to authorize a complete waiver of the duty of loyalty and other 
fiduciary duties.  In Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 
L.P.,299 which involved identical language in Delaware’s then limited 
partnership statute, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed doubt 
whether total abolition of fiduciary duties was authorized.  It noted that 
the language of the statute did not expressly refer to “elimination” of 
fiduciary duties.  In addition, the court observed that the historic 
approach of Delaware courts had been to scrutinize searchingly the 
efforts of fiduciaries to escape fiduciary duties.300  In 2004, the Delaware 
                                                          
 292.  Id. at 1212–13. 
 293.  Id. at 1213. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  No. Civ. A. 19477, 2002 WL 749163, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002). 
 296.  Id. at *4. 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,134(c)(2) (2007). 
 299.  817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002). 
 300.  Id. at 167–68. 
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legislature responded to the dictum in Gotham Partners by amending its 
partnership act,301 limited partnership act,302 and limited liability 
company act303 expressly to permit expansion, restriction, or elimination 
of fiduciary and other duties and liability for the breach thereof.  
However, no agreement may eliminate the implied contractual covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing or limit or eliminate liability for a bad faith 
breach of the implied covenant. 
Although amendment of the DLLCA and other unincorporated 
business entity statutes to authorize complete contractual waiver of 
fiduciary duties but not the implied contractual covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing seems dramatic, it merely highlights in bold relief the 
ongoing evolution of the Delaware law governing those entities toward 
ever greater emphasis on contract and correspondingly less emphasis on 
equitable concepts of fiduciary duty.  An exhaustive examination of this 
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Article,304 but perhaps one 
illustration will be helpful. 
Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal305 involved a limited liability company 
with a carefully negotiated operating agreement that contained a 
supermajority vote requirement giving each of two primary classes of 
members a veto power over most actions.306  Thus, little could be done 
unless both cooperated.  Not surprisingly, a paralyzing deadlock 
developed, and the leader of one of the two classes accused the other 
class of breaching the operating agreement, breaching the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breaching fiduciary duties.307  
In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, the court began its analysis by searching for a duty: 
The sine qua non of pleading an actionable breach is demonstrating that 
there was something to be breached in the first place.  In other words, 
before the Court can start worrying about whether or not there was a 
breach, the Court needs to determine that there was a duty.  In the 
                                                          
 301.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(b)(3), (f) (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
 302.  Id. § 17-1101(d), (f) (West 2011).  
 303.  Id. § 18-1101(c), (e). 
 304.  See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007) (“I conclude that 
parties to contractual entities such as limited partnerships and limited liability companies should be 
free—given a full, clear disclosure paradigm—to adopt or reject any fiduciary duty obligation by 
contract.  Courts should recognize the parties’ freedom of choice exercised by contract and should 
not superimpose an overlay of common law fiduciary duties . . . .”). 
 305.  No. 3017–CC, 2008 WL 1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008), aff’d, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009). 
 306.  Id. at *2. 
 307.  Id. at *6. 
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context of limited liability companies, which are creatures not of the 
state but of contract, those duties or obligations must be found in the 
LLC Agreement or some other contract.308 
Because the veto power was a carefully bargained-for right, the court 
concluded that its exercise could not support a claim for breach of either 
the express terms of the operating agreement or the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.309  More importantly for present purposes, 
the court also failed to find a fiduciary duty.  The operating agreement 
proactively stated that “[n]o Member shall have any duty to any Member 
of the Company except as expressly set forth herein. . . .”310  After noting 
the DLLCA’s permission to expand, restrict, or eliminate fiduciary 
duties, the court concluded: 
Pursuant to this provision, the Genitrix LLC Agreement eliminates 
fiduciary duties to the maximum extent permitted by law by flatly 
stating that members have no duties other than those expressly 
articulated in the Agreement.  Because the Agreement does not 
expressly articulate fiduciary obligations, they are eliminated.311 
Fisk is important as much for the first passage quoted above as for 
the second, because after Delaware’s statutory amendment it is no longer 
an open question whether fiduciary duties can be eliminated; the only 
question is whether, in a given case, they have been.  On the other hand, 
absent contractual modification or waiver, the existence of default 
fiduciary duties is still a matter of debate.  In the first passage, then-
Chancellor Chandler, author of the Fisk opinion, gives a clear indication 
of his belief.  As has been noted in Part II.C, his successor, Chancellor 
Strine takes the opposite view.312 
These matters should be of more than passing local interest in 
Kansas, because of House Bill 2398, introduced in the 2013 Kansas 
Legislative Session.  This bill updates the KRLLCA generally to keep 
                                                          
 308.  Id. at *8 (footnotes omitted). 
 309.  See id. at *8–11. 
 310.  Id. at *9. 
 311.  Id. at *11. 
 312.  See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch.) (“[T]he LLC 
Act starts with the default that managers of LLCs owe enforceable fiduciary duties.”), aff’d, 59 A.3d 
1206 (Del. 2012); see also supra Part II.C.  Feely v. NGAOCG, LLC, No. 7304–VCL, 2012 WL 
6840577 (Del Ch. Nov.28, 2012), decided after the Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Auriga, 
adopted the Auriga Chancery’s view confirming the existence of default fiduciary duties.  The 
operating agreement did not provide for the modification or elimination of fiduciary duties, so the 
question whether they existed was squarely presented.  Because the Supreme Court opinion had not 
ruled that default duties did not exist, Feely felt free to follow the Chancery opinion as a matter of 
stare decisis.  Id. at *9–10. 
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pace with developments of the last thirteen years, including a section that 
adopts the 2004 Delaware amendments that authorize contractual waiver 
of fiduciary duties but not waiver of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.313 
V. CONCLUSION 
At the outset, this Article stated its goal as an attempt to survey 
generally the law of fiduciary duties as applied to Kansas corporations, 
partnerships, and limited liability companies, and to illustrate the extent 
to which corporate analysis and precedents are being applied (or not 
applied) in the context of these other forms of business organization.  On 
the corporate front, due to the widespread adoption of exculpatory 
charter provisions, there has been a major realignment of fiduciary duty 
law, with the duty of loyalty being expanded beyond its classical 
financial conflict of interest bounds to include nonpecuniary misconduct 
not in good faith.314  With respect to partnerships, the Kansas Supreme 
Court, interpreting both statutory and decisional law, has downgraded 
significantly the fiduciary status of partners.315  Finally, particularly in 
Delaware, limited liability companies have assumed a contract-based 
personality that promises to make them an ever more unique and useful 
alternative to corporations.  A legislative proposal currently pending, if 
enacted, will continue Kansas’s tradition of following Delaware’s lead.316 
While this Article does not purport to be completely comprehensive 
or exhaustive, one hopes that it is sufficiently thorough to serve as a 
starting point for further investigation of these developments. 
 
                                                          
 313.  H.B. 2398, supra note 51, § 57.  Because there was insufficient time in the 2013 session for 
both houses of the Kansas Legislature to act on H.B. 2398, it has been held over for the 2014 
session.  For a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the issues, see Scott Gordon Wheeler, 
Comment, LLC Fiduciaries: Where Has All the Good Faith Gone?, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 1063 
(2011). 
 314.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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